# W O S C A P

ENHANCING EU PEACEBUILDING CAPABILITIES

Strengthening the EU Multi-stakeholder coherence in peacebuilding and conflict prevention: examples of good practices

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STRENGTHENING THE EU MULTI-STAKEHOLDER COHERENCE IN PEACEBUILDING AND CONFLICT PREVENTION: EXAMPLES OF GOOD PRACTICES

Whole of Society Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding

This thematic report was produced as part of the project "Whole of Society Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding", which aims to enhance the EU's peacebuilding and conflict prevention capabilities. This paper is part of a series of thematic papers intended to offer a practice perspective on the topics addressed in the first series of orientation papers. They seek to provide operational examples in policy and in the field, and to highlight some of the problems, challenges, gaps and opportunities that arise when considering peacebuilding and conflict prevention from the perspective of each cross-cutting theme that the project focuses on.
More information at www.woscap.eu

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

The EU launched the Horizon 2020 instrument to implement an important EU Research and Innovation programme to secure Europe's global competitiveness. Within this framework, the WOSCAP (Whole-of-Society Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding) project has been initiated in June 2015, with a consortium of 10 partner organisations. The main aim of this project is to enhance the capabilities of the EU for implementing conflict prevention and peacebuilding interventions through sustainable, comprehensive and innovative civilian means. Hereof, ESSEC IRENE published a scoping study "European Union (EU)'s multi-stakeholder approach in conflict prevention and peacebuilding" (Benraïs and Simon, 2015) that addresses the EU multi-stakeholder coherence in peacebuilding and conflict prevention to define the state of the art and research gaps. Its main findings were about inclusiveness and complementary with three levels of actors: within the EU institutions, between the EU and international organisations and with local stakeholders. The study demonstrates that efforts regarding EU initiatives aiming at improving coherence in managing conflict prevention and peacebuilding interventions should be expanded. The fact that the EU Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign Security Policy (2016) included findings pointed out by the WOSCAP project lead to further research and analysis. This resulted in the present report with its main aim to provide examples of good practices that could be generalised and implemented by the EU in the future. The new EU's external action strategy deals with issues such as the importance of the economic dimensions in conflict prevention, peacebuilding, transition and stabilisation, the question of coordination with the private sector, or the further emphasis on the EU Delegations' work in implementing a coherent action on the ground (which has already been developed in the Lisbon Treaty). Currently, the implementation modalities of the EU Global Strategy are central to the reflection conducted by EU staff, hence increasing the importance of providing good practices on concrete topics. The results of the present report are therefore a deeper analysis of the main findings of the scoping study, rather than new research avenues.

A deeper analysis of the WOSCAP scoping study on coherence and the 2016 EU Global strategy lead to the identification of two research axes that have been further developed. First, a reflection on coherence within EU institutions, with a focus on the role the EU Delegation could play for the implementation of a multi-stakeholder approach, as they constitute an institutional crossroad within the EU system and on the ground. The second research axis focused on the actors the EU collaborates with. In this sense it is noteworthy that depending on the EU's definition of CSO (Civil Society Organisation), critical actors such as the private sector and faith based actors are in most cases neglected or absents from peace negotiation processes in EU's policies.

In order to explore these topics further, ESSEC IRENE organized a WOSCAP event in Brussels the 23th June 2016 on "Civil Society, Private Sector, Economic Diplomacy – Questioning the Coherence of the EU External Action in Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding", offering an opportunity for dialogue between EU officials, representatives of CSO and academic researchers. Two roundtables took place; the first on "Addressing the current problems and challenges of coherence between the actors involved in peacebuilding and conflict prevention", the second on "Highlighting the economic dimension of conflict prevention and peacebuilding through the role of the private sector, and link with the economic diplomacy". This event, in addition to interviews with EU officials from the European

Commission and the European External Action Service, resulted in good practices and debates on the research axes. Then, investigations based on a literature review were necessary: additional researches have been carried out on specific cases to feed the report with illustrations of good practices, implemented or not by the EU, and on the challenges encountered.

The present report is complementary to the above-mentioned studies, events and interviews and aims, through the analysis of good practices, to provide a basis for future publications and concrete recommendations to the EU. The second part of the report argues that EU Delegations are privileged EU actors on the ground because they are linked to both internal and external actors. Therefore they are able to implement the comprehensive approach and to sustain coherence of the EU action. The third part addresses the opportunity for future cooperation of the EU with the private sector and faith-based actors in peacebuilding and conflict prevention. Through the analysis of good practices that already have been implemented at local levels, the report explores the opportunities to institutionalise frameworks of action within a systemic approach. To conclude there will be a synthesis of the good practices that could be the basis for further coherence in the EU's external action, paving the way for future recommendations to the EU.

2. Strengthening coherence within EU institutions: example of good practices

The WOSCAP scoping study on multi-stakeholder coherence has highlighted the complexity of the EU system on peacebuilding-related issues, mainly due to the multiplicity of actors involved at the headquarters level and on the ground. One of the major changes implied by the Lisbon Treaty concerning the implementation of the EU's comprehensive approach has been the expansion of the EU Delegations' mandate. This shift in the EU's external action strategy leads to questioning the role of EU Delegations in improving intra-EU coherence and in the development of a strengthened multi-stakeholder approach on the ground.

Their competencies and responsibilities have evolved before and since the Lisbon Treaty, implying the rising legitimacy of the EU Delegation towards other stakeholders in conflict situation, especially EU Member States (Dermendzhiev, 2014). The Treaty of Lisbon set the basis for cooperation between Member States and EU Delegations in order to contribute and implement the EU's common approach (Dermendzhiev, 2014). The modifications implied by the treaty encompass the idea of having EU Member States embassies and EU Delegations with similar level of importance (Dermendzhiev, 2014): their cooperation on the ground, based on shared information, support and coordination, is clearly defined by articles 3 and 5 of the Council Decision of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service, and the article 32 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). In a more general way, the EU Delegation shall represent the EU in third countries, and is responsible for all EU competences (Dermendzhiev, 2014). Due to their privileged position on the ground, EU Delegations are more able to build links with CSOs, which are identified as a major source of information for conflict analysis (Benraïs and Simon, 2015).

In 2016, the EU Global Strategy emphasised again the need to allocate more resources to EU Delegations, considering that "invest in people, particularly those on the ground" will improve "responsive external action", "targeted approaches to resilience, conflict prevention and resolution" and better cooperation with EU Member States (EU Global Strategy, 2016: 48). The rising importance of the EU Delegations in conflict-related issues and their specific links with headquarters in Brussels, EU Member States and CSOs on the ground, raises the question of what this could mean for the contributions of EU Delegations for more comprehensiveness. In this respect, a number of good practices that outline relations built both with European institutions and with actors from the civil society have been identified.

2.1 Coherence between EU Delegations and the Member States embassies: a clear EU political vision to be implemented

Cooperation and joint working between EU Delegations and EU Member States have been emphasized in EEAS (European External Action Service) documents. Dermendzhiev reminds that "the Member States also fall under the general obligation to work with the Delegations, mainly under the 'sincere cooperation' principle (Article 4(3) TEU), the loyalty obligation (Article 24(3) TEU), but also the cooperation obligation between Member States and EU missions

(Article 32(3)).” (Dermendzhiev 2014: 14) The WOSCAP scoping study on multi-stakeholder coherence has highlighted the challenges encountered due to Member States' preference for bilateral diplomacy. However, most practitioners and researchers agree that the EU influence is stronger when acting in coherence with Member States on the ground (Sherriff and Hauck, 2013): speaking with one voice gives more weight and allows to act coherently all together. According to the study conducted by Wouters et al., “Most interviewees suggested that there are functioning structures and arrangements in place for coordination under the leadership of Union Delegations between them and the Member States' diplomatic authorities” (Wouters et al. 2013: 70). With regards to the literature and case studies, two main best practices may be identified: information sharing and burden sharing.

2.1.1 Pooling of resources and information sharing

Agreeing on a common position implies exchanging information through joint reports (Wouters et al. 2013), sending of reports, sharing of intelligence, individual dialogue, sharing of minutes of meetings (Dermendzhiev, 2014). Pooling of resources strengthens conflict analysis, which is key to act coherently and to establish appropriate burden sharing between the EU entities. In that sense, researches have shown that EU Delegations are perceived as “information hubs” (Helly et al. 2014: 8), enabling them to compile economic and political information that can then be shared with EU Member States, especially small countries that do not have such intelligence capacities. Due to this added value, EU Member States often rely on the expertise of EU Delegations (Furness, 2014) .However, according to Beswick, EU intelligence authorities should share more information “to ensure better coherence and alignment with the objectives to which EU Member States have committed” (Beswick, 2012: 10) in order to create a real Whole-of-Society approach. Good practices related to effective information sharing and pooling of resources have been identified. In Kinshasa, cooperation between EU Member States and the EU Delegation was particularly developed. In this sense, weekly meetings took place and there was regular exchange of information during social events. The reports written through joint working were automatically sent to national diplomatic services (Wouters, 2013). In the case of Cambodia (Helly et al. 2015), emphasis was placed on good-working relations developed through retreats with both staffs to favour communication and trust. In addition, joint policy briefs were drafted to ensure the alignment of the EU Member States with the EU Delegation. Communication and pooling of resources between different staffs are facilitated with the setting of colocation (Wouters et al. 2013), constituting incentives to work closely together (Dermendzhiev, 2014).[1] The cases of Ethiopia (embassy of Luxembourg in the premises of EU Delegation) and Yemen (Spanish embassy) have been considered successful (Wouters et al. 2013). However, information sharing is still a challenge when dealing with high sensitive and political topics, and in large countries where EU Member States have strategic interests. This was the case in Iran, when the United Kingdom refused to share intelligence with the EEAS on the nuclear dossier (Dermendzhiev, 2014). This lack of information-sharing may be explained by the poor security on communication networks between EU Delegation and EU Member States (Dermendzhiev, 2014 ; Wouters et al. 2013).

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[1] Colocation in the EU language means that an EU Delegation in a third country is hosting a Member State in its premises.

2.1.2 Burden-sharing and coordination

As stated before, effective cooperation is inextricably linked to communication and coordination. To improve mutual understanding and to build relations for improved communication on the ground, it is necessary for EUDs (European Union Delegations) and EU Member States to coordinate both agendas and to organise regular meetings, chaired by the EUD where possible (Wouters et al. 2013). In order to facilitate coherence between EU Delegations' and EU Member States' actions, the division of work between small groups has been identified as a good coordination practice (Helly et al. 2015), as soon as regular exchange of information is effective. The EUD and several EU Member States effectively implemented burden sharing in Kenya after 2013 by relying on a road map to act simultaneously and coherently, and by avoiding overlaps and counter-productive actions. Similarly, burden sharing has also proved successful in Mexico, based on a geographical division of work between the EUD and the 21 EU Member States (Dermendzhiev, 2014). However, coordination highly depends on power relations. When dealing with conflict situation, the leadership of the EUD has often been perceived as positive, leaving a place for stronger engagement and influence during the process. As outlined by Wouters, the leadership of the EUD relies on the personal qualities of the Head of Delegations in being respected and persuasive, especially to set the agenda and contact the EU Member States, as well as by making them take a common position on sensitive topics (Wouters, 2013). In the case of post-election violence in Kenya in 2008, the Head of Delegation (HoD) chaired weekly meetings with EU Member States to agree on joint positions (Sherriff and Hauck, 2013) including a common statement on economic sanctions towards Kenya.[2]

2.2 Coherence between EU Delegations and EU institutions: conflict analysis and information sharing

The EU has formally adopted the Comprehensive Approach in its 2003 European Security Strategy, and repeatedly committed to enhance coherence in the EU's action for peacebuilding and conflict prevention. In this context, coherence can and should be increased through the adoption of a global approach to conflicts, which means linking peacebuilding and conflict prevention measures to other implemented policies, especially development and humanitarian policies, bringing credibility and legitimacy to the political role of the EU in conflict areas. This perspective requires a good overview of both the EU projects implemented on the ground as well as of the links that can be made between them in order to avoid overlaps. It gives a particular role to EU Delegations as they are EU actors on the ground supposed to be aware of the policies implemented. The efficiency of the EU's external action depends on the EU institutions "ability to get its act together" (Sherriff and Hauck, 2013). Therefore, it requires a coherent strategy with Member States as well as among EU institutions, and between the headquarters and the field.

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[2] This statement was done through the Council Conclusions on Kenya issued by the External Relations Council on 28th January.

2.2.1 EU's versatility

Due to the diversity within the EU's system, network and instruments, its added value relies on its versatility, which allows adapting to changing situations while implementing conflict prevention and peacebuilding processes. Adaptation is "a crucial determinant of a successful EU intervention" (Sherriff and Hauck, 2013: 30). To be efficient and coherent, well-established information-sharing mechanisms (such as intelligence on the phases of the conflict, the political and economic context, etc.) between EU Delegation on the ground and EU institutions in Brussels are particularly important. EU Delegations are part of a wide network of EU entities, able to spread information and contribute to conflict analysis (Beswick, 2012), but they can benefit from their anchor on the ground to behave as contact points between local actors (including CSOs, local governments, etc.) and the EU institutions. Furness pointed out an illustration of the EU's capacity to adapt in Liberia through its interest in initiatives where it was not directly involved or did not have specific interest (Furness, 2014). Indeed, the EU Delegation staff engaged in the monitoring of actions undertaken by other actors in the country in order to be ready in case of changes in the EU's strategy, especially concerning some components of the Security Sector Reform (SSR) process and the development of the Peace Building Trust Fund (PBTF). From this perspective, EU Delegation staff was attending various meetings, allowing them to have an extensive knowledge of what was done in the country in order to improve conflict analysis and to be able to support these projects in the future.

2.2.2 Information sharing

Trust and good cooperation between EU Delegations on the ground and headquarters in Brussels are essential to enhance the credibility of the EU (Helly et al. 2014). The specificity of the EU Delegations is that they receive guidelines from and report to the EEAS as well as to the European Commission (EC) on specific issues (EPLO, 2016), while both have different coordination policies. In situations of crisis, the Managing Directorate or relevant Cabinet is more inclined to follow the evolution of the situation and to oversee the work done by the EU Delegation (Helly et al. 2014). Otherwise, EU Delegations often have a lot of flexibility regarding their roles and initiatives (Helly et al. 2014). According to surveys and interviews conducted with EU officials, relations between DG DEVCO (Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development) and EU Delegations are known to be better than between DG DEVCO and the EEAS, especially because EC staffs are present within EU Delegations (Wouters et al. 2013). The level of communication between them is perceived as good, and the reports published by EU Delegations to the EC are considered of good quality. While communication between different EU entities dealing with violence was limited during the post-election violence in 2007 in Kenya due to the pre-Lisbon context, some noteworthy practices emerged (Babaud and Ndung'y, 2012). The EU Delegation in Kenya produced political reports and exchanged continuously with the Brussels-based Kenya Desk (DG DEVCO), allowing the EC to stay informed. When violence emerged, researchers pointed out the efficient information sharing from the ground to the Brussels's level allowing a coherent EU

action.[3] This was especially the case for supporting EU partners such as Kofi Annan, mandated by the African Union (AU) (EEAS MSP, 2014). Researchers and practitioners stressed that good communication and information sharing depends mostly on the individual attitude and past experience of the Head of Delegation, the EU Delegation staff, and the Commissioner, especially in crisis context (Helly et al. 2015). The Heads of Delegation have the opportunity to provide "greater unity and a clear chain of command that is missing in Brussels" (Wouters et al. 2013): contrary to the division of labour between EEAS and EC in Brussels, EU Delegations are responsible for all external dimensions.

2.3 Coherence between EU Delegations and local actors: setting, developing and structuring the CSO networks

The WOSCAP scoping study on multi-stakeholder coherence (Benraïs and Simon, 2015) has highlighted the necessity for the EU to engage with CSOs in order to ensure a coherent action in peacebuilding and conflict prevention in third countries. Since the 2001 Gothenburg Programme, the EU has made repeated commitments to strengthen its cooperation with CSOs, but researchers and practitioners still believe that it is crucial to improve this further. This would enable the EU to base its intervention on the local needs, to be legitimated on the ground, and to guarantee sustainability. The lack of diversity among the CSOs working with the EU or supported by EU funds is still a challenge (Pouligny, in De Almagro Iniesta, 2013). Researchers point out that the EU favours the CSOs that fit its definition of CSO (apolitical, independent from the government, working on some priority topics for the EU). The purpose of this section is to point out that resources and positions of EU Delegations may enable the EU to address this issue. The following section demonstrates that EU Delegations are key actors on the ground, and able to enhance coherence in the EU's action in peacebuilding and conflict prevention, as they have the means and opportunities to establish relations and reach relevant local actors in the civil society. The following section will present examples of practices that have already been implemented by some EU Delegations in conflict areas, and which could be extended.

2.3.1 Access to grassroots information

First and foremost, EU Delegations have a physical presence on the ground, which enables them to have regular contacts with CSOs, to develop networks and organise meetings. Therefore, EU Delegations are often able to provide extensive intelligence on the context and conflict analysis (Furness, 2014). According to the literature, the efficiency of EU Delegations in that field highly depends on the willingness and ability of the EU Delegation staff to establish such relations with CSOs (Helly et al. 2014). The EU's policies and engagement towards comprehensiveness in peacebuilding and conflict prevention have to be accompanied by concrete practices on the ground in order for them to have a significant impact (Helly et al. 2014). First, active work of the EU staff for understanding and mapping the relations between

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[3] An interesting coordination mechanism have been established between the EU Delegation, DG DEV in Brussels, the cabinet of the European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid (Louis Michel) and the Head of the EU-Election Observation Mission (Alexander Graf Lambsdorff).

all the stakeholders, at local and national levels (CSOs, authorities, communities, companies, etc.), closely or remotely involved in the conflict is crucial (Helly et al. 2014). The next step is to build relationships or partnerships with targeted stakeholders, relevant to the coherence of the EU's action. At this step, Helly et al. insist on the necessity to go beyond the traditional relation between donors and beneficiaries (Helly et al. 2014), and to establish a regular dialogue based on trust and information sharing. In that sense, Furness gives the example of Liberia where meetings were organised by the EUD on the root causes of conflict in the country with local people from the CSOs invited to participate and exchange with donors (Furness, 2014). According to the author, the EU Delegation was then perceived as "engaged, sensitive and accessible", establishing the basis for long-term cooperation.[4]

2.3.2 Support of CSOs

The success of EU intervention highly depends on its ability to work with its partners, such as other international organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), but above all local civil society and parties to the conflict. It is impossible to work alone when dealing with mediation (Sherriff and Hauck, 2013), therefore EU Delegations are in the best position to improve multi-stakeholder approach on the ground and to strengthen civil society actors. After the resignation of the corrupted government in Guatemala in 2015, the EU Delegation has been contacted by many organisations, among which small NGOs, militaries, companies, and members of the government.[5] Small and new NGOs wanted to be supported and financed by the EU to increase their legitimacy and capacity of action as institutional national NGOs had lost their credibility due to their closed links with the former corrupt government. In this situation, the EU Delegation has faced the difficulties of supporting smaller NGOs that were not considered legitimate by the government, and of explaining the conditions of EU funding to small CSOs that were not used to deal with international funders. In this case, the role of the EU Delegation's was to bridge the gaps between local CSOs and EU Funds. In Nepal, the EU Delegation took advantage of its participation to small projects on governance, which give it access to information from NGOs and local partners and from the UN.[6] By avoiding highly sensitive political issues and preferring being involved in grassroots projects, the EU was perceived as a neutral and "core development partner" by local authorities.[7] Nevertheless, not all CSOs are able to collaborate with EU Delegations, mostly because they have to be institutionalised in order to receive funds from the EU. De Almagro Iniesta illustrates it through the example of the platform OSCAR (Organisations de la Société Civile Appuyées et Renforcées) in Burundi, supported by the EU, and which was conceived as a place where local, small grassroots CSOs could meet, share ideas and receive trainings. Several obstacles arose as the volume of requests was so overwhelming that the EU Delegation had to focus on CSOs

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[4] Furness highlights in his study the fact that the EU Delegation's work in Liberia during the second civil war between 1999 and 2003 has been based on an extensive knowledge of the situation in the country, mostly fed by meetings and discussion dealing with conflict issues.

[5] Inputs from EU official during the event organised by ESSEC IRENE on 32 June 2016.

[6] In addition to different programmes implemented by the EU Delegation in education, economic cooperation and peacebuilding, among them: "a contribution to the Nepal Peacebuilding Trust Fund (NPTF) and an education budget support programme" (Furness, 2014).

[7] Unlike other foreign powers which are acting at the political level.

working on the most strategic issues for the EU. Moreover, numerous CSOs have faced difficulties to understand the procedures and the terms used by the EU for the application (De Almagro Iniesta, 2013). Rigidity and slowness of EU instruments have been considered as obstacles, especially regarding "non-traditional local actors", "small-scale organisations" (Helly et al. 2014). This remains a challenge as they are among the most legitimate actors on the ground, but do not have the means nor the working culture to comply with bureaucratic procedures requested by the EU.

To some extent, the case of the EU intervention during the Mindanao conflict can be considered as a model of coherence. Information sharing has been effective at all levels by the EU Delegation, on the ground with CSOs and EU Member States, and with EU institutions in Brussels. Good coordination mechanisms have allowed the EU to coordinate its action and position with the EU Member States, but also to adapt to a changing context in terms of use of instruments, and regarding its evolving support to CSOs.

The role of the EU in the Mindanao conflict

The EU's involvement in the Mindanao region has evolved throughout the years from a humanitarian and development support, to deeper engagement in the peace process (MacDonald and Vinals, 2012). The EU succeeded in adapting to a changing context, based on the assumption that poverty was highly linked to peace, marking the urgency to support the peace process (Houvenaeghel, 2015). By providing first humanitarian assistance, the EU gathered information on the ground to address the root causes of conflict. A broader approach was then implemented through the Instrument for Stability, with the funding of CSOs closely working with parties to the conflict and local civil society in the conflict through the Instrument of Stability (MacDonald and Vinals, 2012).[8] The EU first supported their development, and then progressively encouraged their participation to the peace process spreading their messages on national and international levels (Sherriff and Hauck, 2013 ; MacDonald and Vinals, 2012). The EU benefited from the sharing of their local knowledge, thus constituting its major source of information and fostering a better understanding of the situation. Due to its perceived neutrality and impartiality as well as its long-term commitment to the country, the EU was invited to take responsibilities in the peace process (Houvenaeghel, 2015; MacDonald and Vinals, 2012).

The initiatives taken by the EU Delegation were backed by Brussels thanks to effective sharing of information on the phases of the conflict between the EU Delegation and the Asia Department in Brussels (Sherriff and Hauck, 2013). Nevertheless, the EU Delegation had to constantly balance between Brussels and Manila (Houvenaeghel, 2015).[9] As the scope of the EU's intervention has gradually extended through the Instrument for Stability, the EU Delegation was in a position of leadership with EU Member States, and did not faced strong disagreement from their sides due to low national interests (Houvenaeghel, 2015). Similarly, the various EU missions in Mindanao have been properly coordinated, with regular reports from the EU to EU Member States and Heads of Mission (Sherriff and Hauck, 2013).

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[8] The EU especially engaged with one international NGO (Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue) and two local ones (CHD, Nonviolent Peace Force and Mindanao People's Caucus)

[9] According to researchers, it is difficult in this context to become a major player and to increase visibility whereas Brussels does not have a strong interest in being influential.

3. Strengthening coherence with CSOs and other non-state actors: example of good practices

The EU's Comprehensive Approach is based on coherence with a range of local and international actors with a stake in peacebuilding and conflict prevention (Benraïs and Simon, 2015), especially CSOs. The inclusion of CSOs when intervening in third countries has been consistently emphasised in EU conflict-related policies. Even if the EU's definition of CSO has evolved throughout the years, it remains unclear as to what actors are covered by that definition. Indeed, actors that have an impact in conflict situations, such as the private sector or faith-based actors are not consistently included in the EUs definition of CSO. This is a serious obstacle to the coherence of the EU's action on the ground, as cooperation with such non-state actors relies on individual choices, and not on concrete guidelines ensuring comprehensiveness. This raises questions on whether such actors could be integrated in a systematic approach in order to institutionalise the relationship that might be established between them and the EU. It seems crucial to reflect on the possibility to build frameworks and provide guidelines on how EU staff should deal with these actors.

Due to the fact that the EU's engagement with the private sector and faith-based actors is not based on a clear framework, the following sections are based on good practices by these non-state actors outside EU intervention. Their aim is to indicate ways the EU could support their actions and enhance future cooperation.[10]

3.1 Integrating the private sector in peace processes: taking advantage of a multi-faceted actor

The EU's Comprehensive Approach aims to address conflict prevention and peacebuilding through a coherent and global perspective, emphasizing the enhancement of the civil society. As mentioned in the WOSCAP scoping study on multi-stakeholder coherence (Benraïs and Simon, 2015), the integration of the private sector within the CSO's definition has been unclear.[11] Moreover, the literature has been largely focused on the negative impact of business in conflict situation, particularly the extractive sector (Killick et al. 2005). Killick et al. stated that it implied a biased picture, ignoring the great diversity of business actors and the benefits that could be generated by their involvement in peacebuilding. The purpose of this section is to show the relevance of business in peacebuilding and conflict prevention, not yet explicitly addressed by the EU. During an event organised by ESSEC IRENE on 23 June 2016 in Brussels, the question of the economic dimensions of conflict has been tackled, considering it as an integral part of conflict analysis.[12] This implies the recognition of private sector, which

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[10] For another, complementary analysis of the significance of multi-stakeholder approaches and the inclusion of marginalised groups see also the WOSCAP paper on local ownership (Bojicic-Dzwelilovc and Martin, 2016).

[11] The EU recognized the private sector as a civil society actor in the European Consensus on Development (EU, 2006), but not in the 2012 EU Communication on Europe's engagement with civil society in external relations (EC, 2012).

[12] WOSCAP Roundtable on "Civil Society, Private Sector, Economic Diplomacy – Questioning the Coherence of the EU External Action in Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding", 23 June 2016, Brussels

can be considered both as a peace or as a conflict driver, and with a certain impact on the context and actors involved. Therefore, its inclusion in the peacebuilding and mediation processes appears to be a necessity. This idea is backed by remarks of some participants concerning the large funding support to CSOs provided by the private sector. Secondly, the literature and the analysis of various case studies suggest that the private sector has implemented interesting conflict prevention and peacebuilding actions in several conflict cases. This paves a way for reflecting on how the EU should cooperate with the private sector, as it is already the case with CSOs and other international organisations. Some participants pointed out that their interest of profit represents a risk as it is not always compatible with the promotion of general interest and peacebuilding. Such debates occurred mainly because of the broad definition of private sector actors as it can refer to transnational or domestic companies. Moreover, depending on their priorities, interests, relations and resources, they can be both conflict and peace drives (Gunduz and Tripathi, 2008). This emphasises the importance for the EU or other partners to have a strong conflict and context analysis before engaging with the private sector (Gunduz and Tripathi, 2008).[13] Therefore, authors such as Gunduz and Tripathi suggest peacemakers, such as the EU, to address the following questions: how to deal with the private sector? How can they support conflict resolution and prevention (Gunduz and Tripathi, 2008)? In other words, some researchers point out the need for the EU and other international donors to take the challenges and opportunities of engaging with these actors into account. In the current globalised world, business has to be considered as parties in conflict. Therefore, it is crucial to integrate them in the EU's external Comprehensive Approach.

As underlined in the WOSCAP scoping study on EU multi-stakeholder coherence, the private sector has never been mentioned as a key actor in peacebuilding in previous EU's external action strategies, such as the 2003 European Security Strategy, and it revised version in 2008, contrary to other international organisations, regional powers or CSOs. This omission has been partly adjusted within the 2016 EU Global Strategy: the private sector is repeatedly defined as a key player and particular attention is drawn to the fact that the EU "will deepen [our] partnerships with civil society and the private sector as key actors in a networked world" (EEAS, 2016: 18). Therefore, now that the implementation of this strategy is being discussed, the question as to whether such an important actor, considered as both conflict and peace driver, could cooperate with the EU and contribute to peace.

3.1.1 Conflict analysis

In a context of social, economic or political crisis, the private sector is never neutral, as it is always positively or negatively affected by the situation (The Corporate Engagement Project, 2003). At the same time, business actions have, intentionally or not, an impact on the conflict (Killick et al. 2005). Therefore, they must necessarily be taken into account in conflict analysis as parties to the conflict (Killick et al. 2005; The Corporate Engagement Project, 2003) and their incentive to engage should be addressed.[14] Companies are more likely to act when their interests are at stake (Gunduz and Tripathi, 2008), but the way they decide to act depends on

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[13] "Larger companies are more able to act, but smaller companies may be more willing to act and are closer to the ground" (Gunduz and Tripathi, 2008).

[14] This is even more the case when considering that "most conflicts are, at least partly, driven or sustained by economic agendas" (Killick et al. 2005).

the context, their influence and the political environment (Gunduz and Tripathi, 2008).[15] It can be rationally argued that companies mainly prefer working in a stable and peaceful environment, as it reduces the reputational, legal and cost risks (The Corporate Engagement Project, 2003), especially where they are investing at the long-term in the country.[16] Based on these assumptions, the private sector is more likely to intervene if conflict and violence are damaging their business (Gunduz and Tripathi, 2008). On the other hand, researchers insist on the importance of identifying the ways in which the private sector can contribute to the rising of tensions and the perpetuation of conflict (Killick et al. 2005). In Northern Ireland in the early 1990s, the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) had a strong incentive to engage in the peace process after 30 years of violence, stating that economic prosperity was impossible without peace. Its work was focused on advocacy and on publishing conflict-related research papers, especially on the negative impact of violence on the economy of the country, raising awareness in the media and at the political level (Killick et al. 2005).

Concerning their resources towards local populations, some companies benefit from past experience of philanthropic actions which enable them to have a solid anchor to intervene in peace processes (Gunduz and Tripathi, 2008). These resources and experiences are key to contributing to a solid conflict analysis and to a good understanding of the economic and political conflict, which are the basis for a coherent conflict-resolution approach (Gunduz and Tripathi, 2008). In this sense, the Consultative Business Movement (CBM) together with the South African Council of Churches in South Africa, initiated a move towards an inclusive peace process in order to end apartheid. Their expertise and the relations they built in the past on the basis of trust and impartiality helped to facilitate discussion between conflicting parties during the negotiations and to convince reluctant actors to participate (Gunduz and Tripathi, 2008).

3.1.2 Influence and leverage of actions

Even if actors of the private sector are stakeholders in the conflict, they can engage in peace process only if other actors perceive them as credible, trustable, impartial and legitimate and if they are, of its added value (Killick et al. 2005; Gunduz and Tripathi, 2008).[17] In that sense, they benefit from several advantages. First, the private sector is often seen as an apolitical actor (Gunduz and Tripathi, 2008), enabling it to act when others have their hands tied. Moreover, as business mostly requires peace and stability to prosper, they are able to convince other actors of their credibility (Killick et al. 2005). Some argue that traditional peacebuilding actors such as NGOs have sometimes lost their credibility or impartiality, therefore offering an opportunity for the private sector to demonstrate its legitimacy and ability to act positively. In addition to legitimacy, private sector actors also benefit from their experience and predominantly human, social and political resources (Gunduz and Tripathi, 2008; Owuor and Wisor, 2014). These can be used to initiate peacebuilding actions and to prevent the rising of tensions. Moreover, they

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[15] The private sector is not homogenous, their interests and strategies vary, which gives room for different partnerships and engagement (Killick et al. 2005).

[16] More specifically, conflict might imply "destruction of infrastructure, loss of skilled workforce, reduction or complete collapse of foreign investment, prohibitive security and insurance costs, loss of markets, regulatory confusion and diminished support from the government" (Killick et al. 2005).

[17] Tripathi and Gunduz mentioned the fact that the private sector has "to earn its place" (Gunduz and Tripathi, 2008).

can also count on a wide network at different levels of the society.[18] They benefit from privileged relations with the highest levels of economic and political power, generally involved as parties to the conflict.[19] It constitutes an added value in comparison to most peacebuilding NGOs that do not have such tools of influence (Owuor and Wisor, 2014). In addition, they have the possibility to act collectively (Gunduz and Tripathi, 2008) and to take advantage of the diversity of sectors and sizes to have more or less influence (Owuor and Wisor, 2014). In Colombia, the violence that emerged during the mid-1990s led the business sector to support the peacebuilding dialogues and projects initiated by several NGOs. Some researchers argue that the influence of the private sector in supporting the mediatisation of the peace initiative set the stage for enabling the peace process between the government and the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) (Gunduz and Tripathi, 2008). Following these initiatives, the Colombian government enacted a law allowing CSOs, including business actors, to participate in the peace process. The support of the business sector to the negotiations between the government and the Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional (FMLN) also proved successful in El Salvador after more than 10 years of conflict. In addition to political support, the private sector used its economic and social influence and resources by establishing a reciprocal relation with former FMLN combatants during the post-conflict situation: on one hand, business actors started to fund conflict-related researches and to provide financial support to encourage former combatants to graduate. On the other hand, FMLN engaged in a dialogue on economic, judicial and political reforms.[20]

3.2 Cooperating with faith-based actors: an entry point for engaging with all layers of society

While the Treaty of Lisbon strengthened the legal framework for interreligious dialogue within the EU Member States, there is still a lack of concrete examples of effective cooperation between both actors within the EEAS. Indeed, studies show that while religion is widely considered as a trigger for conflict, faith-based actors (FBOs) can also be important peace drivers. In this sense, it is noteworthy that FBOs and religious leaders (RL) have increasingly been identified as potential partners within the civil society for conflict prevention and peacebuilding by the EU. However, while the EU does promote interreligious dialogue in conflict situations triggered by religious tensions or conflicts, it is still reluctant on engaging religious dialogue and mediation for non-religious triggered conflicts. Moreover, the EU lacks a clear definition of what is considered an FBO and there are no clear guidelines available for the EU on how to engage with those actors as insider mediators in conflict situations.[21] On the

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[18] Tripathi and Gunduz give a non-exhaustive list of the variety of actions undertaken by business sector "from direct participation in negotiations to indirect activities aimed at influencing negotiators, including lobbying (overt and covert), shuttle diplomacy, supporting off-the-record meetings, disseminating knowledge and participating in multi-sectoral dialogues" (Gunduz and Tripathi, 2008).

[19] In most societies, business is linked with states and governments, at least for matters related to taxes and employment (Owuor and Wisor, 2014).

[20] Example from Gunduz and Tripathi, 2008.

[21] According to Bercovitch and Kadayifci-Orellana (2009: 185), "faith-based actors can be defined as organizations, institutions and individuals who are motivated and inspired by their spiritual and religious traditions, principles, and values to undertake peace work". Within this definition, the authors identify not only organizations who explicitly identify themselves as religious but also actors that take the religious component as a given without emphasizing

other hand, the United Nations (UN) and the United States Agency of International Development (USAID) have been successfully cooperating with FBOs and religious leaders in conflict situations. Examples of cooperation with FBOs show their relevance as a multidimensional and multi-layered peace driver in fragile societies. Moreover, FBOs can play a key role in different stages of a conflict: in conflict prevention, during an ongoing conflict or by taking part of the peace process. Finally, FBOs usually can count on important financial support through their international networks, community members, charities and significant donations (Bercovitch and Kadayifci-Orellana 2009). However, when engaging with FBOs, some elements should be taken into consideration such as their legitimacy, sources of funding and their openness to discussion and to embracing sensitive topics.

3.2.1 Inclusive dialogue

Studies and practice show that religion often lies at the heart of tension within or between societies. However, it is important to note that the religious factor of conflicts is often a result of a degradation of the economic, social and political situation in a country (Benraïs, 2015: 334). Therefore, it is important to engage with all CSOs and other non-state actors, including FBOs and religious leaders in order to create an inclusive dialogue for conflict prevention and resolution.

The case of Malawi is a good example of conflict prevention as the country is relatively stable but has a high poverty and unemployment level and a high rate of young population. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the EU are both present in the country assuring the stability, peace, and development by supporting the Public Affair Committee (PAC), a high-level committee formed by the major religious denominations capable of political leadership- both financially as well as technically (UNDP 2016). The EU and the UNDP assisted the PAC with strengthening their national-level mediation capacities, facilitating public dialogue on and advocacy around the national consensus on controversial issues and building local capacities for conflict prevention (UNDP 2016). In addition, the UNDP assisted the PAC on risk analysis for violence during and after the national elections in 2014 (UNDP 2014a). The PAC also played a significant role for the inclusion and mobilization of women during conflict resolution and advocacy processes (UNDP 2014a), which enhances their chances for a successful mediation. In this sense, during the 2014 election period and in partnership with UN Women, 29 Women in Faith (WIF) were trained in mediation and peacebuilding. By 2015, five of them joined the 6-member core PAC mediation team. This proved to be successful in the aftermath of the 2014 elections when a political crisis emerged. The mediation of the PAC during this crisis prevented a further escalation of the situation and allowed the president to be sworn in a week after the riots (UNDP 2014a). Moreover, the PAC has facilitated the national debate on contested issues in a country divided by politics and tribalism by promoting a common understanding of federalism (UNDP 2016).

The collaboration of the UNDP and the EU with the PAC can be considered a success for conflict prevention and the maintenance of peace in the country. It is also a good example of how collaboration with FBOs, through their multi-level legitimacy, can help to advance the EUs

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their religious affiliation. There are also religious organizations represented by a wide spectrum of religious actors, thus creating an interreligious platform for mediation and peacebuilding.

agenda, on topics such as the inclusion of women in conflict resolution, by providing mediation and peace training to WIF.

3.2.2 Mediation

During a conflict situation, FBOs can play a pioneer and paramount role to ease the tensions and create room for dialogue as a civil society actor that enjoys high legitimacy and able to reach all layers of society (from grassroots to high level leaders) through sermons, educational practices, and community centers (Bercovitch and Kadayifci-Orellana 2009: 188). The FBOs also help to create a common ground, enabling peace dialogue. Moreover, their effort to prevent conflict and maintain peace continues even after the international peacemakers have left the country and could, thus, constitute an exchange and monitoring platform with the EU when finalizing peace building missions (FoRB 2013). The example of Mozambique illustrates how an international religious entity can be a pioneer to create common ground between two parties in conflict. The first step towards soothing the tensions was through an official State visit of the pope to the country in 1988, causing a change in the official state policy regarding the three major religions. During the conflict, the key mediators between the two conflictive parties (FRELIMO and RENAMO) were the leaders of the Mozambican Churches (Catholic and Protestants) through the facilitation of informal and explorative meetings between both parties. The mediation of the representatives of the Anglican and Catholic resulted in the willingness of RENAMO to cease fire and search for common ground with FRELIMO. The Catholic church of Mozambique turned towards Rome and the Sant'Egidio community for support during the peace efforts in Mozambique. Following the difficulties to appoint a mediator accepted by both parties, the mediators for the 1992 General Peace Agreement were a member of the Italian government, members of Sant'Egídio Community and the Mozambican Archbishop of Beira, as well as members of the Catholic hierarchy (Baptista Lundin 2014). In this conflict, Sant'Egidio did not only act as a mediator during the peace-talks, but also created a common ground between both parties, facilitating thus the beginning of the negotiations, a factor that could not be accomplished by other mediators during the conflict (Baptista Lundin 2014). Moreover, the Sant'Egidio community was already present in the country offering humanitarian help (Anouilh 2005). After the Mozambican experience, Sant'Egidio continues acting as a mediator in countries such as Algeria, Ivory Coast and Albania.

During conflicts triggered by religious tensions, FBOs or religious leaders can play an important role as a mediator in conflict situations, by providing training in peace-making methodologies or by establishing interfaith dialogue (Smock 2008). According to Smock (2008:1), the main advantage of interfaith dialogue is the mitigation of interfaith tensions and the prevention of subsequent conflict. Moreover, it can also create a favourable climate for further peacebuilding dialogue and efforts. An example where interreligious dialogue has played a key role for conflict resolution is the case of the Nigerian civil war where conflict between Muslims and Christians led to the creation of the Interfaith Mediation Center (IMC). The IMC has been working on mediation between religious leaders, training of youth leaders for each Nigerian state as well as broadening their focus from religious issues to larger social problems such as unemployment and poverty (Steele 2011). The USAID collaboration with the IMC mainly consists in financial support and providing knowledge consisting of teaching how to develop proposals, write reports and create new grant agreement solicitations (USAID 2009).

The IMC is a strategic partner to the work of USAID in Nigeria as it was already engaged in the conflict and conducted several peace building efforts before its cooperation with USAID. In this sense, EPLO (European Peacebuilding Liaison Office) suggested a closer cooperation of the EU with the Interfaith Mediation Committee (IMC) in Nigeria; there is however no clear track of the EU engaging with the IMC during their Nigeria mission (European Peacebuilding Liaison Office, 2012).

To some extent, the case of Kenya is a model of coherent actions undertaken by the private sector and faith-based actors in conflict prevention and peacebuilding, outside EU intervention. It demonstrates how these two actors used their political, economic and social influence as leverage of actions for technical and mediation support.

The resources and influence of the private sector and faith-based groups in Kenya

In the context of the Kenyan national elections in 2013, various peacebuilding and conflict prevention initiatives have been implemented to avoid post-election violence as was the case in 2003. Among the actors involved, the private sector committed to "systematic, comprehensive and effective" efforts to favour peaceful elections. The Kenya Private Sector Alliance (KEPSA, a business organisation bringing together industry associations and some corporate firms) launched the "Mkenya Daima" campaign before the elections. The campaign aimed to spread a message of peace and collective involvement through meetings organised with different entities such as media owners, CSOs, inter-faith groups, political entities and individuals. In that sense, faith-based organizations have played an important role to ease the tensions by speaking out against violence, defending justice and human rights and supporting inter-party dialogue. Moreover, the National Council of Churches of Kenya has supported inter-ethnic and inter-faith dialogue at a multi-layered level, helping communities to understand political processes (Haider 2016).

In addition to this campaign, business used their political influence to pressure political candidates to commit to peace during the elections, but also engage in legislative advocacy with emphasis put on peacebuilding-related measures to favour a good business environment. Moreover, its resources allowed the private sector to engage with media companies[22] by reporting political issues, in order to ensure an appropriate processing of information.

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[22] Such as the Standard Group, the Nation Media Group, and the Royal Media Services.

4. Conclusion

Based on a deeper analysis of the main findings of the WOSCAP scoping study on multi-stakeholder coherence and on additional research, the present report emphasises coherence at two levels. First, within EU institutions a series of good practices has been identified. This report focusses on the role of EU Delegations as a bridge between EU institutions based in Brussels, EU Member States on the ground and CSOs in particular. The good practices that came to light through the analyses encompass information sharing, coordination, good mechanism of conflict analysis, strong local anchor and the EU's versatility. To a certain extent, the case of the Mindanao conflict where the EU implemented coherence at all levels can be considered as a model, thus paving the path for designing concrete guidelines. Moreover, the report has demonstrated the relevant position of EU Delegations to prevent incoherence and lack of efficiency of the EU's external action, which has consequences on the allocation of technical and financial resources.

Another dimension highlighted in the report focused on the role played by the private sector and faith-based actors in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Whereas the EU does not integrate these actors in its strategy, the report demonstrated the necessity to establish a framework to include them into negotiation and peace processes considering the economic and religious dimensions of conflict. Their capabilities in terms of conflict prevention and peacebuilding have been presented, most of them being implemented outside EU's action. A number of organisations have implemented a series of good practices including conflict analysis, mediation, inclusive dialogue and the use of political, social or economic influence. The case of Kenya during the 2013 elections addresses these criteria, demonstrating the relevance of their actions. Considering these findings, the EU should establish partnerships or frameworks to integrate these non-state actors in its peacebuilding strategy. Regarding the private sector, the EU has already built partnerships with companies based on the Corporate and Social Responsibility (CSR) policy. However, in order to adopt an effective multi-stakeholder coherence, their cooperation should go beyond CSR and link with peace and conflict prevention. Currently, even if CSR has been well integrated in the way companies are conducting their business, the notion of peacebuilding is considered to be out of their power of action (The Corporate Engagement Project, 2003). Therefore, companies are reluctant to engage in issues regarding politics (Killick et al. 2005; The Corporate Engagement Project, 2003). Important international donors such as the EU or the UN could, through their programmes and financial aid, enhance the role of the private sector in peacebuilding and conflict prevention (Killick et al. 2005). Indeed, economic dimensions need to be seen as a continuum from conflict prevention, peace, reconstruction, stabilization and global development. The economic dimensions of conflict and peace must be incorporated within the European economic diplomacy, definition and strategy to last peace. The implementation of the EU Global Strategy will be considered in this regard, and developed through further analyses and researches.

The following table encompasses the good practices enunciated in the report and its related case studies.

Table 1 - Overview of good practices on coherence in conflict prevention and peacebuilding

Topics		Good practices	Case studies
Strengthening coherence within EU institutions: example of good practices	Coherence between EU Delegations and the Member States embassies	**Pooling of resources and information sharing** Communication, colocation, joint reports	Cambodia Kinshasa, DRC Philippines
		Coordination and burden-sharing Joint meetings, EU Delegations leadership	Kenya Mexico Philippines
	Coherence between EU Delegations and EU institutions	**EU's versatility** Local anchor, conflict analysis, monitoring of actions undertaken by other actors	Liberia Philippines
		Information sharing Sending of reports, individual attitude	Kenya **Philippines**
	Coherence between EU Delegations and local actors	**Access to grassroots information** Engagement with local CSOs, building relations, trust, sharing of information	Liberia **Philippines**
		Support to CSOs Establishing good relations, trust, legitimacy, reciprocal relations	Guatemala Nepal Burundi **Philippines**
Strengthening coherence with CSOs and other actors: example of good practices outside EU intervention	Integrating the private sector in peace processes	**Conflict analysis** Assessing private sector's impact and relations, links with the locals, past experience	Northern Ireland South Africa **Kenya**
		Influence and leverage of actions Political influence, use of the media, financial resources	Colombia **Kenya**
	Cooperating with	**Inclusive dialogue**	Malawi

	faith-based actors	Technical and financial support, conflict analysis, facilitating dialogue, legitimacy	Kenya
		Mediation Multi-level approach, mediation, technical support, providing knowledge	Mozambique Nigeria **Kenya**

This report does not include one of the main findings of the WOSCAP scoping study on multi-stakeholder coherence concerning the level of cooperation between regional and sub-regional organisation, especially in the case of the African Union. In-depth study should be conducted in order to strengthen coherence of the strategies implemented on the African continent by the EU and other international organisations. It is paramount to have a global overview in order to make the necessary adjustments. Given the limited amount of information available in the literature, this issue requires deepened research and interviews; therefore it will be included in a subsequent publication.

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