Insight into research findings on EU peacebuilding interventions from case studies and thematic reports

Various authors

Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict
Whole of Society Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding

This paper introduces and provides the main insights of the research done in the Country Case Studies, Desk Reviews and Thematic Reports of the WOSCAP project. It is a compilation of the main research results of the project “Whole-of-Society Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding”, which aims to enhance the EU’s peacebuilding and conflict prevention capabilities. They are written by various experts involved in the project consortium. The purpose of the WOSCAP Working Paper series is to highlight key topics and concepts relevant to the EU’s peacebuilding and conflict prevention agenda. More information can be found at www.woscap.eu. If you wish to receive our newsletter, please contact the Project Coordinator at g.vogelaar@gppac.net.

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<tr>
<td>ANSF</td>
<td>Afghan National Security Forces</td>
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<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
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<td>CA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Approach</td>
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<td>CFA</td>
<td>Cease-Fire Agreement</td>
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<td>CICIG</td>
<td>International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala</td>
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<td>COBERM</td>
<td>Confidence Building Early Response Mechanism</td>
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<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
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<td>CSR</td>
<td>Corporate and Social Responsibility</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<td>ECOVAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>ECP</td>
<td>Escola de Cultura de Pau (ECP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESSEC IRENE</td>
<td>Institute for Research and Education on Negotiation</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUAM</td>
<td>European Union Advisory Mission</td>
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<td>EUBAM</td>
<td>European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUCAP</td>
<td>Sahel-Mali European Union Capacity Building Mission in Mali</td>
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<tr>
<td>EULEX</td>
<td>European Union Rule of Law Mission</td>
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<td>EUPOL EU</td>
<td>Police Mission</td>
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<td>EUMM</td>
<td>European Union Monitoring Mission</td>
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<td>EU SR</td>
<td>Special Representative</td>
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<td>EUTM</td>
<td>Mali European Union Training Mission in Mali</td>
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<tr>
<td>FBO</td>
<td>Faith-based organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCC</td>
<td>Agreement Gulf Cooperation Council Agreement</td>
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<td>GID</td>
<td>Geneva International Discussions</td>
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<td>GoSL</td>
<td>Government of Sri Lanka</td>
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<td>GPPAC</td>
<td>Global Partnership of the Prevention of Armed Conflict</td>
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<td>GSP</td>
<td>Generalised Scheme of Preference</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and Communication Technologies</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<td>IPRM</td>
<td>Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism</td>
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<tr>
<td>IWP</td>
<td>Institute for World Policies</td>
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<td>LSE</td>
<td>London School of Economics and Political Science</td>
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LTTE  Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MINUSMA  United Nations Integrated Multidimensional Stabilisation Mission in Mali
MTD  Multi-track diplomacy
MTF  Methodological and Theoretical Framework
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDC  National Dialogue Conference
OEF  Operation Enduring Freedom
PAOSC  Support Programme for Civil Society Organisations
PARADDER  Support Programme for Administrative Reform in Decentralisation and Regional Economic Development
PASS  Programme in Support of the Security Sector
PDF  Political Development Forum
PSC  Political and Security Committee
SAA  Stabilisation and Association Agreement
SBC  State Building Contract (SBC)
SSR  Security Sector Reform
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
WOSCAP  Whole of Society Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding
WPS  Women, Peace and Security
Introduction

This paper highlights and gives insight into the main research deliverables of the WOSCAP project. Its purpose is to highlight and make accessible key topics, learnings and recommendations resulted from the research and relevant to the EU peacebuilding and conflict prevention agenda. The full reports can be found at www.woscap.eu/publications.

The paper introduces the following:

- The Country Studies of Ukraine, Georgia, Mali and Yemen. These four country studies take an in-depth look at selected EU policies in each of these countries providing us with detailed insights in the EU policy process and in the ways the EU capabilities are forged and used in selected policy areas.

- The Desk Studies of selected EU policies in other contexts analyse Kosovo, Afghanistan, Guatemala/Honduras and Sri Lanka. These Desk Studies complement the four country studies with EU policies in other relevant contexts beyond the field research. The Desk Review collects documented lessons learned on these EU policies. Afghanistan and Kosovo were selected because of the important role (though quite different) the EU has come to play in both countries. These two reports are therefore longer than the ones on Guatemala/Honduras and Sri Lanka, where the role of the EU is not as significant.

- The Best Practices Reports compile and analyse lessons learned and good practices regarding different EU policies and capabilities. Specifically:
  - ICTs & EU civilian peacebuilding: Reflections on good practices, opportunities and challenges.
  - Local Ownership Challenges in Peacebuilding and Conflict Prevention.
  - Civil-Military Synergy at Operational Level in EU External Action.
  - Strengthening the EU Multi-stakeholder coherence in peacebuilding and conflict prevention: examples of good practices.
  - The Role of the EU and Other Third Parties in Promoting the Gender, Peace and Security Agenda in Mediation and Dialogue Processes.
Case Studies

1. Assessing the EU’s conflict prevention and peacebuilding interventions in Ukraine

Authors: Leonid Litra, Ivan Medynski and Kateryna Zarembo – Institute of World Policy (IWP), Ukraine

The case study Report on Ukraine was produced by IWP in Ukraine as part of the WOSCAP project. It contains the research findings on the European Union’s (EU) interventions in conflict prevention and peacebuilding in Ukraine. The report focuses on: 1) the role of The European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) and the European Union Advisory Mission (EUAM) Ukraine reforming the security sector; 2) on the European Union Governance Intervention in Ukraine, namely the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) funded action called “Restoration of Governance and Reconciliation in Crisis - Affected Communities of Ukraine”, and 3) on the European diplomatic intervention with the Normandy Format. This case study report is based on both a desk research and field research, which consists of in-depth Interviews with the representatives of local as well as international actors. Firstly, the report briefly depicts the relations between Ukraine and the EU and contextualises the EU interventions. The report further provides some relevant background information about the Ukrainian national context, both before and after the Revolution of Dignity (EuroMaiden) took place and also presents an overview of international interventions. Finally, the report focuses on possible areas for improvement and recommendations regarding the EU civilian capabilities to realise peacebuilding and conflict prevention more inclusively and sustainably.

The two Security Sector Reform (SSR) missions EUBAM and EUAM are quite different in terms of institutional set-up and length of operation: EUBAM is the EU’s only "hybrid" mission, administered by the European Commission (EC) but supervised by the Council, while EUAM is a civilian Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) mission. EUBAM’s focus is on the local level of the Border and Customs services while EUAM covers all of Ukraine’s civilian security sector and aims to provide strategic advice. Overall, none of the missions contribute directly to conflict prevention and peacebuilding, instead concentrating on institution-building on a strategic and local level. The different institutional nature of EUBAM and EUAM and larger flexibility of EUBAM suggests that maybe in sensitive geopolitical environments, EUBAM’s “hybrid” nature could be used as a blueprint for further missions.

The initial mandate of the EUAM was to provide strategic consultation and coordinate donor support to civilian SSR in Ukraine (Zarembo 2015). After a strategic review of the mandate, EUAM works according to three pillars of activity: a) strategic advice on civilian Security Sector Reform, b) support for the implementation of reforms, and c) cooperation and coordination (EUAM 2016).
Overall, the beneficiaries of the mission appreciated the work of EUAM and expressed for example that the role of the mission as the channel of communication between Brussels and the beneficiary institution was useful. The key challenges to EUAM’s work can be categorized into a) a lack of domestic strategic reform vision and a civil-military dilemma, b) the domestic resistance to reform, c) a lack of trust between the mission and local partners, and d) EUAM’s low profile.

Furthermore, a number of interlocutors among the local partner institutions admitted that gender-related issues are of secondary priority in SSR. With regard to multi-stakeholder coherence, the EU-US “rivalry” was also observed by some commentators in 2015, when the US prevented the EU from “co-owning” the police patrol reform. Some interlocutors in the beneficiary institutions also confirmed that EUAM is not the priority partner for them but the US, Canada and Japan. EUAM and, most importantly, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and Member States, should be ready to adopt a flexible approach to the mission’s mandate, being ready to respond to the needs of the local beneficiaries and the changing geopolitical context.

The EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) to Moldova and Ukraine has been operating since 2005. The daily activities of EUBAM experts consists of two main duties: 1) the on-the-job training of Moldovan and Ukrainian customs and border guard personnel and 2) patrolling the border and making unannounced visits to the border checkpoints. The mission has been identified as largely successful in realizing its objectives. One of EUBAM’s key achievements is considered to be the introduction of a new customs regime between Moldova and Ukraine. In a whole range of interviews which the author has carried out on EUBAM, not a single beneficiary complained or criticised the mission.

Meeting in the presence of Pavlo Zhebrivsky, Head of the Donetsk Regional State Administration, and Christos Stylianides, Member of the EC in charge of Crisis Management.

None of the missions in question were sent to prevent a crisis/conflict. Both of them were dispatched after the conflict already erupted. For further EU interventions it would be
advisable to dispatch an institution-building mission simply on the grounds of the existing institutional weakness, and not after the institutions fail to prevent a conflict.

In Ukraine, governance reform is an ongoing process that started after the proclamation of independence in 1991. In Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the issue of local ownership regarding local governance reform has been vividly demonstrated by the actions of local communities. EU and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) representatives have emphasized that conflict-affected communities have demonstrated the willingness to not only receive assistance from international institutions, but also to participate in shaping the vision and strategies for change.

The EU has been active in setting up the Geneva format (April 2014) for negotiating a peaceful settlement of the conflict and the stabilization of Ukraine. Although the Geneva Format was replaced by the Normandy Format, which no longer included the EU but a representation by Germany and France, Brussels remained active in helping Berlin and Paris put together a settlement plan. However, the EU and its member states, with a leading role for Germany and France, have managed to move a considerable part of the fight to the diplomatic arena by creating the Normandy Format. It seems that there is a consensus that bringing Russia and Ukraine into a diplomatic process has played an important role in de-escalating the conflict. At the same time, it is not clear to what extent the Normandy Format has the capacity to turn into a political settlement process from a ceasefire and “freezing” process.

The EU has been slow in responding to the crisis in Ukraine and the following conflict between the Kremlin and Kyiv. The EU’s policy towards the conflict was rather process driven and therefore the decisions of the EU were subordinate to the situation on the ground in Ukraine, which weakened the EU’s intervention in conflict settlement. The EU’s difficulties in having a clear role in conflict settlement in Ukraine were also generated by the institutional void and change of EU leadership when the conflict emerged. An EU mechanism that would ensure a smooth transfer of power and not affect its capacity to act in the international arena was largely missing.
2. Assessing the EU’s conflict prevention and peacebuilding interventions in Georgia

Authors: Prof. Nana Macharashvili, Ekaterina Basilaia and Dr. Nikoloz Samkharadze – Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University, Georgia

This case study report presents an overview of the European Union’s (EU) civilian capabilities in peacebuilding and conflict prevention interventions in Georgia and was compiled by the Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University in Georgia. The report mostly deals with the period from 2008 until 2016 and particularly focuses on three cases: 1) the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM), 2) the Geneva International Discussions (GID), and 3) the Confidence Building Early Response Mechanism (COBERM), a joint initiative by the EU and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The study answers the following question: how can EU’s civilian capabilities be enhanced in order to make the EU’s conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts in Georgia more inclusive and sustainable. The report introduces the national context of the conflict and provides some general overview of EU policy in Georgia before analysing the selected cases of EU interventions and concluding with policy recommendations.

EUMM monitors focus on human security matters and hosts civil society information sharing meetings and meetings with Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) to follow up on sensitive cross boundary line matters. The EUMM’s focus on stabilization, normalization and confidence-building mandate is concretised mostly through activities that can be classified as part of Multi-track Diplomacy (MTD) efforts. The EUMM activities and strategies support unofficial dialogue and problem-solving activities aimed at building relationships between authorities and civil society leaders, while also contributing to people-to-people interactions at the grassroots level to help build confidence between communities. The link of EUMM with Security Sector Reform (SSR) or Governance Reform issues is very limited.

Local as well as international stakeholders generally assess the functioning of the EUMM positively, highlighting the importance of the mission in spite of its narrow profile. The EUMM’s importance tends to be evaluated by local as well as international stakeholders in similar terms. However, the lack of a long-term mandate affects its functioning. Further, the fact that the EUMM mandate covers the entire territory of Georgia, as defined by the country’s international borders, the de facto authorities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia have so far denied the Mission access to the territories under their control, which is regarded as an obstacle to the intervention’s success. The Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) is assessed as the most successful mechanism by all stakeholders within and outside the country as these meetings offer opportunities for all participants to discuss events and incidents, and to raise concerns on the security situation and the conditions for the civilian population.

The GID is the most important EU initiative directed at resolving the conflict in Georgia as it is the only international mechanism accepted by all relevant stakeholders, local as well as international. For the last eight years the GID has been the only platform where the conflict related issues are discussed, including security, the return of internally displaced persons (IDP) and the humanitarian needs of the conflict-affected population. However, the only notable
success of these is the establishment of the IPRM for Abkhazia and South Ossetia which provides recommendations as to prevent future incidents and provides a platform to verify the accuracy of information in the aftermath of incidents. Despite this, the GID have failed to produce agreements on the return of IDPs and refugees and on improving the human rights situation in conflict regions. Another barrier for success is the issue of Georgia’s and Russia’s divergent interpretations of the vaguely-worded six-point peace plan. Further, Georgian stakeholders underline that the GID failed to build trust among the parties to the conflict. In addition, the GID is elitist and thus closed to outsiders. The lack of transparency and information provision and the exclusion of the civil society is regarded as its main weakness.

The COBERM programme, funded by the EU and implemented by the UNDP, connects to MTD efforts in Track 1.5-II and Track III. COBERM is oriented to stimulate people-to-people contacts across conflict divides, and to generate increased capacities within communities as well as CSOs to mediate political differences in constructive ways. COBERM has been able to engage increasingly with stakeholders in the breakaway regions, in spite of considerable distrust towards the initiative at its launch and also permits a large degree of flexibility. All research participants underline that COBERM is an impartial, apolitical and flexible mechanism that centres on people and their needs and priorities. However, COBERM exemplifies the difficulties of applying a Whole of Society approach to peacebuilding and conflict prevention.
The study draws out the dilemmas of local engagement in a context in which ownership by one party in the conflict is detrimental to the possibilities of trust and ownership of the other party.

The study indicates that Georgian experts and policymakers perceive all three key instruments to be relevant. Local actors also perceive the EU as relatively efficient in its various peacebuilding and conflict prevention capacities. Nonetheless, these same local actors also consider that the EU’s role in the ongoing Georgian conflicts is limited. The implementation of COBERM is outsourced to the UNDP, with the EU functioning predominantly as a donor. In the framework of the GID the EU does not have a great deal of leverage. Instead, it holds shared responsibilities with other international actors. Finally, the EUMM has limited operational capacity inside the breakaway territories, since its access to these regions is highly restricted.

All three cases studied confirm the importance and need for more effective and efficient application of the horizontal as well as vertical coordination mechanisms. Further, most Georgian research participants emphasize the need for a stronger engagement of non-state actors in the whole process of the EU interventions, including its several stages of design, implementation and evaluation.
3. Assessing the EU’s Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Interventions in Mali

Authors: Prof. Moussa Djiré, Dr. Djibril Sow, Prof. Kissima Gakou and Prof. Bakary Camara - Université des Sciences Juridiques et Politiques de Bamako, Mali

This case study was compiled by the Université des Sciences Juridiques et Politiques de Bamako in Mali and contains research findings on how the European Union (EU) interventions contribute to preventing conflict and consolidating the peace process in Mali. It is based on both desk review and field research, including in-depth interviews with local, national and international representatives. The report focuses on: 1) EU’s Multi-track diplomacy (MTD) in Mali; 2) EU’s support for Security Sector Reform (SSR) with the European Union Training Mission (EUTM-Mali) and the European Union Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP Sahel-Mali); and 3) EU’s Governance reform in the case of the Administrative Reform, Decentralisation and Regional Economic Development Support Programme (PARADDER), the State Building Contract and the Support Programme for Civil Society Organisations (PAOSC I and II). At all levels, the EU policies were reviewed against the background of Mali’s peace process, in order to understand to what extent the EU is able to contribute to conflict prevention and peacebuilding interventions in the case of Mali, and whether and how it uses sustainable, comprehensive and innovative civilian means to do so.

The Malian crisis can be seen as twofold: a security crisis in the North with the presence of armed groups and an institutional crisis followed by the coup d’état of 22 March 2012. The combination of the two interconnected crises laid bare the weakness of the Malian State and led to the occupation of two-thirds of Mali’s territory by various armed groups in 2012 and early 2013. International intervention was necessary to re-establish control over key areas in the North of the country.

Since the crisis escalated, in January 2012, numerous initiatives have tried to deal with Mali’s profound socio-political and security problems. However, only in 2015, following negotiations held in Algiers, a National Peace and Reconciliation agreement was signed in Bamako. This agreement, facilitated by a team of mediators which included the EU, contains important provisions that change the country’s institutional fabric. Although the agreement raised great hopes, the definition of implementation terms and conditions have also divided the protagonists.

The suddenness of the fall of democracy in 2012, the violence of the attacks and the multi-level consequences of the crisis led the members of the international community in general, and the EU in particular, to invest heavily in a return to peace. The EU has employed several interventions to contribute to the establishment and consolidation of peace, and key among them are MTD, support for SSR and support for governance reform. Indeed, the EU and EU Member States have been key players in helping Mali emerge from the crisis. France fulfilled a special role in this, with its deployment of the operations Serval and Barkhane, and its strong diplomatic presence.
This report demonstrates that, since the start of the crisis in Mali, MTD has proven its capacity to contribute to the promotion of peace dialogue amongst stakeholders with diverging interests. Several elements stand out. First, the EU’s capacity to engage with and support the role that different international institutions or governments were already playing. This allowed enhancement of crucial support for key efforts undertaken by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union, and the Algerian government, among others. Here, the EU showed the importance of its capacity to cooperate rather than to dictate. Second, the EU focus on multi-stakeholder diplomacy allowed the EU to engage and interact with a range of non-state actors, a dynamic that also proved its worth in relation to the peace process.

In 2013, the EU set up a Malian Security Forces Training Mission (EUTM-Mali) tasked with strengthening the Malian army, focusing on operational deployment and on strengthening of the chain of command. The EU furthermore supports the EUCAP-Sahel-Mali, set up in 2014. This programme focuses on capacity building, training, equipment, and organisation development for the police, Gendarmerie, and the National Guard. EUCAP also supports the improvement of the justice system, including training of justice officials and policy development.

Research participants pointed out that the training programmes of both EUTM and EUCAP were designed in part on the basis of local inputs, which strongly enhanced the quality and relevance of the trainings. An item of critique was the multiplicity of international stakeholders aiming to engage with Malian institutions (i.e. in the case of SSR, MINUSMA is an important actor as well), which sometimes leads Malian stakeholders to perceive a sense of rivalry between international actors, which may be vying for the attention or favour of Malian stakeholders.

Finally, with regard to EU interventions in the sphere of governance support, it must be taken into account that the EU has already supported governance in Mali for many years. In the aftermath of the 2012 crisis, as the transition towards legitimate government began, the Malian State found itself in dire financial and institutional circumstances. In this context, the EU used governance support interventions mainly as a tool to keep the State afloat. These measures, most crucially exemplified in the State Building Contract (SBC) mechanism, were indeed essential to keep the Malian institutional framework in place. It made the democratic transition and the peace agreement possible.

Decentralisation, regionalisation and civil society development all have an important role to play in helping to provide long-term solutions for the conflict in Mali. It is clear that socio-economic development of the marginalised regions, as well as the distorted power balance between the local and the national in the actual functioning of the Malian State constitute longstanding grievances that have fed the conflict. In this sense, Mali’s current state of affairs justifies the continuation of governance support in the fields in which EU has already been active for many years. Nonetheless, given the somewhat modest previous results, more reflection might be necessary on the kind of changes that are needed to ensure lasting peace and development.
For the EU’s support for governance reform in Mali, it has to be taken into account that Mali’s heavy dependency on foreign assistance has a paradoxical impact on the institutional development of the country. The EU might consider the peace process in Mali as an opportunity to redesign governance reform in such a way as to avoid the relative stalemate of previous years, in which results have been largely disappointing. A pre-condition for this is the establishment of a broad consensus among international donors and actors in Mali that donor policy and practice need to be revised accordingly.
4. Assessing the EU’s Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding interventions in Yemen

Authors: Alia Eshaq and Suad Al-Marani – Political Development Forum (PDF), Yemen

This case study was produced by PDF in Yemen and presents research findings about the ongoing European Union (EU) intervention in the cluster of Multi-track diplomacy (MTD). This study is based on both desk review and field research, including interviews with local and foreign stakeholders. It contains a broad insight into Yemen’s national context and the EU’s policy, including EU-Yemen relations. Further it provides an overview of Yemen’s Arab Spring and the EU’s response to it. In this regard, it evaluates and assesses the EU’s MTD efforts and concludes with lessons to learn and concrete improvement suggestions. The report largely ignores the EU’s interventions in the cluster of Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Governance reform mainly due to the fact that the country is currently undergoing a massive military operation that has led many actors to flee Yemen. Another factor are the travel restrictions within the country and difficulties of communication. Nevertheless, this report offers a broad grass-roots perspective on the EU’s contribution to Yemen’s transition process and on how to improve.

The EU’s decision to support the general framework of the Gulf Cooperation Council Agreement (GCC Agreement) in 2011 shaped the course of the EU’s relationship with Yemen. The EU played a prominent role in securing the conclusion of the GCC Initiative, alongside the US and Saudi Arabia. The GCC Agreement was supposed to create a conducive environment for the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) which included to end the ongoing armed conflicts and to address the division within the army.

While the NDC had been scheduled to end in September 2013, the third and final plenary session was characterised by boycotts of delegates and political deadlock that extended the process for another four months. The issue that caused the deadlock was the overarching issue of future power-sharing agreements and different controversial proposals for federalism. When the original NDC deadline passed, violence in the Northern provinces flared up and spread quickly. The Saudi-Arabian air strikes and the aerial and naval blockades resulted in a widespread destruction of infrastructure, a huge amount of civilian casualties and a catastrophic humanitarian situation, starvation and the outbreak of cholera. In addition, the situation in the South has created a permissive environment for al-Qaeda and IS leaders.

From the beginning, the EU was closely involved in attempts to find a political solution for the situation in Yemen, alongside the GCC and the US. Prior to the signing of the GCC Agreement, the EU reached out to the youth activists, encouraging them to adopt a common negotiating position. Prior to the start of the NDC, the EU continued to play a significant role, in particular offering capacity building for youth, women, and other non-traditional actors. The EU also provided direct financial support for the NDC. During the NDC, the EU provided support to the different working groups and technical expertise of the NDC. After the conclusion of the NDC, the EU supported the Constitution Drafting Committee. Since the beginning of the Saudi-led military intervention in March 2015, support for ongoing negotiations to end the conflict and return to a peaceful transitional process has been the key
political priority for the EU. This support has consisted of low-key diplomacy in trying to reach out to some of the conflict parties, most importantly the Houthis. The EU Delegation has also supported the mediation efforts of the UN Special Advisor and attended the three rounds of UN-brokered negotiations and further provided a capacity-building workshop to the members of the delegation.

However, in academic evaluations there is surprisingly little attention for the role of the EU in the transition process. In order to fill this blind spot, interviews with stakeholders were conducted and a survey developed and distributed. Based on this, conclusions about strengths and weaknesses of the NDC and its inclusivity, local ownership and the role of women and youth can be drawn. The majority of the respondents and interviewees see the implementation of the NDC’s outcomes as the greatest weakness. Other weaknesses identified are regarding the NDC’s planning and execution and its disconnection to the population. In many ways the NDC failed to engage the decision makers and key stakeholders.

One of the frequently cited key strengths of the EU as a diplomatic actor in Yemen was the EU’s perceived neutrality and its acceptance among a wide range of local actors. This has enabled the EU to gain access, and create dialogue channels with groups that were not directly involved with the negotiations of the GCC Agreement.

Further, the research revealed that the EU’s technical advice and capacity building was much appreciated, especially in terms of contributing to making the transition process more inclusive. However, major obstacles as the lack of the coherence of EU’s policies, the limited engagement with beneficiaries and a limited understanding of the context and political order stand out.

This report, with its special focus on the NDC, offers valuable insight into strengths and weaknesses of EU’s contribution to Yemen’s transition process in regards to MTD and provides further insight into the conflict background and international interventions.

Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the EC, received Abdulmalik Al-Mekhlafi, Yemeni Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Over the past twenty years, the European Union (EU) transformed from an actor with limited leverage to a major player in Kosovo. The EU made large financial commitments to Kosovo, and despite the disagreement between EU members about the status of Kosovo, the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) entered into force in April 2016. In the post-independence period the EU stepped up its presence in Kosovo by deploying the European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) in Kosovo, the largest Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) mission. Furthermore, the EU took the lead in a new dialogue process between Kosovo and Serbia. Arguably, there is no other country where the EU plays a more central role in the processes of state building and stabilization than in Kosovo.

The interventions discussed in this report relate to two of the three areas of intervention that are the focus of the WOSCAP project. The EULEX mission is a case of governance reform, while the EU facilitated dialogue is a case of EU diplomacy. Of the cross-cutting themes local ownership and Multi-stakeholder coherence are particularly relevant. The report reflects on EU capabilities in each of the two interventions.

In the Methodological and Theoretical Framework (MTF) of the WOSCAP program, capabilities are defined as the 'ability and capacity to achieve objectives in relation to the overall mission and have to be understood in relation to expectations and ambitions with regard to stated (policy) goals'. Whitman and Wolff distinguish between the capabilities to act, to fund, and to coordinate/cooperate.

The EULEX mission had a broad mandate (including a strengthening and executive mandate) and it is fair to say that it faced serious challenges in terms of its capability to act. It proved difficult to build an organisation that was able to implement such a broad mandate. There were problems to contract capable staff and EULEX experienced serious problems in terms of its administration and its communication strategy. Furthermore, the fact that a civilian mission was initially led by a military staff member was questioned by several (former) staff members of EULEX.

While improvements with regard to the capability to act were necessary and feasible according to several external evaluations, it is still questionable whether the broad objective of EULEX to address the rule of law in almost all its dimensions was realistic. In this regard, there is a need to take into account the limitations and challenges of the context in which a mission deploys. In its report about rule of law interventions, ECA (2012) recognized that the 'specific
circumstances’ of Kosovo were partly responsible for the disappointing results of the EULEX mission so far and that more could have been done. However, even when EULEX would have performed better, the question emerges what realistic ambitions are, what the opportunities for reform are, which sectors are resistant to change, etc. This is not a plea for the EU to lower the standards for rule of law reform as a requisite for EU accession, but there is a need to be more realistic in what a mission like EULEX will be able to reach and what not.

The EULEX mission deployed not only in a complex environment, but also in a changing national and international environment. When the EU started to develop EULEX, it assumed that it would work under a different mandate than United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, while eventually the mission was supposed to be 'status neutral'. The continuing ambiguity and controversy about the status of Kosovo, both at the international level and within the EU, led to renegotiations about the deployment of EULEX and eventually to a ‘handicapped’ EULEX mission. These early years of the mission show that a lack of international consensus seriously hampers the capacity to act. While the EU proved a certain degree of flexibility in adapting to the new situation, the capacity to adapt a mission like EULEX to changing circumstances, new insights, and backlashes appears to be a major challenge.

These adaptations also negatively affected the legitimacy of EULEX in Kosovo. It became a ‘status neutral’ mission – something that was not appreciated by Kosovo’s political leadership and population. This shows that not only the expectations of the EU are relevant to assessing its capabilities, but the expectations and perceptions of local leaders and people also have an impact. National political leaders generally had to accept the EULEX mission, but it is fair to say that they were more interested in support for Kosovo’s independence and prospects of EU accession. Many Kosovar citizens were sceptical about EULEX’s capacity to fight corruption and to ‘catch the big fish’, and generally not happy with the mission punishing its ‘war heroes’.

Round table with Branimir Stojanović, Deputy Prime Minister of Kosovo, and Johannes Hahn, Member of the EC in charge of European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations.
This ties in with the problems of local ownership. EULEX both aimed at strengthening the Kosovar judicial sector, while at the same time taking the necessary measures (among others through its executive mandate) to stop corruption. It was not always easy to reconcile these objectives. While EULEX did cooperate with the police, custom agencies and judicial sector, the ECA report (2012) emphasized that Kosovo was becoming a ‘captured state’, and pointed at the unwillingness of political elites in Kosovo to implement the necessary reforms. This points at two fundamental problems of the idea of ownership that are relevant to cases of governance reform in weak states. Firstly, the counterparts of governance programs may not have a genuine interest in the proposed reforms. Secondly, external actors (like the EU and the US) have to match their ‘governance agenda’ with other policy agendas and interests (stability) for which they may need to cooperate with these same political elites.

While the EULEX mission has been heavily criticised for being ineffective, the dialogue was hailed as a success. The EU portrayed the dialogue as an example of the ‘European method’ of seeking peace through practical cooperation. The dialogue shows that the EU is able to facilitate negotiations, leading to increased cooperation between Kosovo and Serbia, but it is fair to say that the practical cooperation was primarily a result of the effectiveness of political pressure of the EU. In this regard the EU showed its ability to play a ‘political role’ in managing to bring parties to the negotiation table that were not really willing to start a dialogue about the normalization of their relations and the EU strategically used its leverage by linking the dialogue to its other instruments (most notably the SAA).

The European External Action Service (EEAS) also showed a capability to coordinate with international actors – in particular the US – at the moment that the dialogue reached its most difficult moments, but the dialogue process came at the price of excluding large sections of Kosovar and Serbian society. Given the contrasting views and positions about the status of Kosovo at all levels (from the local to the international) a more inclusive dialogue process may sound like a mission impossible, but it seems that the EEAS did not even try to develop more inclusive processes of Multi-track diplomacy, and seemed to believe that an elite pact was the only viable option. The choice to focus on an elite pact did come at the price of a lack of transparency. The political leaders from Serbia and Kosovo sent out different messages to their constituencies, and after signing the Brussels Agreement in April 2013, politicians in Belgrade increased their grip on the North of Kosovo.

The dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia has further been criticized for a de facto change of strategy of international actors that placed less emphasis on rule of law reform (as promoted by EULEX) and more on hammering out a political deal. Bodo Weber (2015) noted that while there was indeed a need ‘to put the Dialogue first’ in order to secure Kosovo’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, the EU and the US ‘have underperformed in furthering democratization and the rule of law [and] have been consistently trading democracy and the rule of law to concentrate their efforts on solving the status dispute conflict’. While this view is not shared by all EU officials, few doubt that tensions exist between different EU interventions and that the capability to work in and across different policy domains was put to the test in the case of Kosovo. It is equally clear that the view of how to work across different policy domains, how to sequence interventions, and what a priority is and why, will often be contested.
6. State-building in the Shadow of War: EU capabilities in the fields of conflict prevention and peacebuilding in Afghanistan

Author: Toon Dirx, MA – Utrecht University, The Netherlands

This Desk Study Report discusses the European Union (EU) capabilities in Afghanistan in the fields of conflict prevention and peacebuilding by situating the EU’s efforts in the social and political processes in which they have developed. In doing so, it touches upon various overarching clusters and cross-cutting themes of the WOSCAP project, namely local ownership, Multi-stakeholder coherence, and Security Sector Reform (SSR). EU capabilities within these realms are understood as the ability and capacity to achieve objectives in relation to the overall mission. Hence, these capabilities need to be explained in relation to the expectations and ambitions articulated in the EU's stated policy goals (Martin et al. 2016: 16). In Afghanistan, where the EU has arguably put forward rather high expectations and ambitions, it follows that the EU has needed relatively great capabilities to realise these goals.

From the overview of Afghanistan’s history in the twentieth century, it became clear how in an almost dialectical process modernist and traditionalist forces have competed for power and invoked increasingly violent reactions to each other’s attempts to rule the country. This dynamic has persisted in the post-2001 era where, in the wake of military involvement led by the United States of America (US), the EU and other international actors became increasingly involved in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. After a period of international disengagement with Afghanistan in the 1990s, following the attacks of 9/11, powerful foreign actors once again sought to influence the country’s domestic affairs. This time, the external involvement was rooted in the idea that fighting terrorism in Afghanistan and simultaneously building up a new Afghan State would not only make Afghanistan a safer place but would more importantly also safeguard Western states from 'breeding grounds' and 'safe havens' for transnational terrorism.

The close cooperation between the US and Afghan warlords to oust the Taliban regime determined the political future of the country to a large degree, since the warlords were not merely part of a military strategy to get rid of the Taliban but also became heavily involved in managing the institutions of the new Afghan State. While the Bonn Agreement put forward the ambition to create a ‘broad-based, gender-sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully representative government’, in practice this was never realised. International donors – including the EU – who had state-building ambitions were confronted with the central dilemma of working with or against the warlords, and as the international involvement in Afghanistan evolved from a light footprint approach to a much more intrusive form of external state-building, a complex field of Afghan and international actors emerged in which some focused on building peace, while others sought to wage war. This fundamental tension illustrates how the international state-building project that unfolded became driven and shaped by different logics, justifications, and approaches that competed, or even directly contradicted, each other. Moreover, within that complex field of stakeholders, national political interests of international actors and
(transatlantic) diplomatic relations often trumped the concerns and needs of ordinary Afghans. This increasingly revealed the ambiguities of ‘local ownership’ in Afghanistan.

In the shadow of a US-led war, the EU has sought to build peace and support a liberal state-building project. It has sought its role in the civilian domain, but has nevertheless been highly dependent on what happened on the battlefield. Since 2006, the insurgency has grown, civilian casualties have increased, and even though the EU’s assistance to Afghanistan since 2001 has been of tremendous proportions, it has been overshadowed, and repeatedly undermined, by an ongoing war between insurgents, and the US, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Thus, this dynamic draws attention to the contentious nature of a civilian mandate in a context that continuously hinders its implementation.

With that civilian mandate, the EU has consistently advocated the need to strengthen Afghanistan’s state institutions. While this support certainly contributed to capacity building of the Afghan State in various sectors, it has also been questioned for strengthening structures that were highly corrupt. So while the EU has undeniably helped to support the Afghan State with a fairly large capability to provide funds, it has also contributed to the culture of corruption it seeks to abolish. The EU’s support for a state with such limited oversight and accountability mechanisms reveals a central dilemma the Union has faced in Afghanistan. In addition to these external challenges, EU efforts have also been challenged by EU Member States, in great part because instead of supporting EU initiatives, they were generally more focused on their own bilateral assistance to Afghanistan and their military contributions to NATO and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Moreover, since EU Member States had considerable disagreements about the appropriate strategy to deal with Afghanistan, it was extremely difficult to coordinate the efforts of Member States and, moreover, to represent the Union in Afghanistan with one voice. This troublesome effort has been illustrated by describing how the EUSR instrument developed in Afghanistan. EUSRs in Afghanistan have had the strenuous task of giving a political presence to a Union with Member States that have had fundamental disagreements on the course of action to be followed.

Habiba Sarabi, Deputy Chairperson of the Afghanistan High Peace Council (HPC) speaking at the conference “Empowered women, prosperous Afghanistan”.

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These coordination problems are thus not merely technical but also highly political. Coordination issues were further compounded by internal strife between the Commission delegation and the Office of the EU's Special Representative (EUSR) and poor cooperation between Brussels and the EU delegation in Afghanistan. In sum, the EUSR’s capability to coordinate and cooperate has thus been limited, at best.

All above-mentioned external and internal challenges came together in the EU Police Mission (EUPOL) in Afghanistan. By analysing the drivers behind the mission, it became clear that the establishment of EUPOL was highly political at various levels. The mission was the outcome of a complex interplay between national political arenas, bargains between ministries, compromises between member states, and US pressure on Europe to take up a greater responsibility in Afghanistan. Once EUPOL finally started, its implementation was marred with difficulties. In an increasingly insecure environment, American militarised police training programmes overshadowed the EU’s civilian efforts, and, without a much needed agreement with NATO, effective police training became extremely challenging.

At the same time, however, EUPOL faced many problems that were homegrown. The wide range of internal challenges has primarily been rooted in a lack of political will among Member States to support the mission. Hence, EUPOL never lived up to its expectations and is widely seen as a disappointing EU-SSR effort. The EU’s capability to act in this regard has thus been highly problematic.

Overall, there has been a considerable gap between the EU’s stated policy goals and ambitions in Afghanistan and its capabilities in the fields of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. While the EU may have contributed to considerable improvements in, for example, the education and health sectors, reforming the country’s governance and rule of law has proven to be far more complicated. Perhaps this gap between policy goals and capabilities is not necessarily a problem, since one may argue that these goals merely guide EU actions and that, in practice, their implementation is only partially feasible. Nevertheless, it draws attention to questions of where the Union can realistically make a difference in Afghanistan, what it is technically capable of doing, and for what type of activities it can count on the political support of Member States. Confronting the deeply political questions inherent to peacebuilding in an adverse context is vital for the EU if it is truly interested in supporting an ‘Afghan-led’ and ‘Afghan-owned’ peace process in a war that has taken so many lives and has provided so little benefit.
7. EU engagement with Sri Lanka: Dealing with wars and governments

Authors: Prof. Dr. Ir. Georg Frerks, Toon Dirkx, MA – Utrecht University, The Netherlands

This report outlines the engagement of the European Union (EU) with Sri Lanka in relation to the conflict between the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) that affected the country for a period of 26 years. It gives a brief overview of the origin and history of the conflict and the post-war period up to mid-2016. Then a general overview of the international involvement in the conflict is given, followed by a more specific description of the EU’s engagement in relation to the Sri Lankan conflict outlining among others the major EU policies and programmes. It concludes identifying the capacities and capabilities of the EU in this particular setting of conflict and post-conflict conditions.

In the early stages of the Sri Lankan conflict the EU was not a very visible actor, like other western nations or international organizations. In the 1990s the EU became slowly more outspoken on the situation in Sri Lanka, largely expressing its view on Sri Lanka’s human rights record and the promulgation of state of emergencies by the Sri Lankan government. The EU also asked attention for the (humanitarian) situation on the ground in the conflict-affected areas and urged the conflict parties to engage in a process of peaceful conflict settlement. In those years the donors had fairly little traction with the then government that opposed the ‘internationalization’ of the conflict or any attempts to help mediate the conflict. One important aspect of the EU’s presence was and continues to be is that it can coordinate and substantiate the positions of the EU Member States, many of which have only relatively small missions in Sri Lanka.

After a new government came into power and the Cease-Fire Agreement (CFA) was signed, the situation changed drastically. The international (mainly western) donor community wholeheartedly and perhaps uncritically started to support the peace process diplomatically, politically and with development funding. The EU was no exception, but also gained a more prominent role as one of the four co-chairs of the peace process together with Japan, Norway and the United States of America (US). The EU allegedly help kept the balance between the facilitator Norway, the more traditionally inclined Japan and the anti-terrorist US. The EU was seen to keep the lines open to especially the LTTE who was very sensitive towards issues of ‘parity’. The EU also communicated to the LTTE at the highest levels during the peace process. It can be concluded that, though the EU increasingly became a more prominent and active diplomatic and political actor, its room for manoeuvre was in fact determined by the warring parties and the stances of the subsequent Sri Lankan governments towards outside interference that varied considerably over time. Neither the EU nor the other external parties involved had much influence over those dynamics and could do preciously to change the state of affairs.

The EU is one the most important trade partners of Sri Lanka and its main export market. Though the earlier Rajapakse government’s tried to deny this, there are no easy alternative markets for this in the Asian region. The recently concluded talks about the export
of fish and fisheries products can exert an important leverage on the government. Currently the EU is engaged in such talks and monitoring progress in the field of the requirements and conditions attached to the admission of the GPS+.

The EU has contributed to peacebuilding and reconciliation activities through a number of smaller projects carried out by Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) under the EU instrument for Democracy and Human Rights where five NGO’s worked together on a ‘Platform for Freedom’. Though the amounts involved have been relatively small, the funding was experienced as very useful, nearly indispensable for the type of work done and also the contacts and support given by the Delegation was highly valued.

The EU has carried out a consistent and relevant post-conflict reconstruction and development programme focused largely on the needs of the conflict-affected areas. Its MIPs have been complemented by regional programmes and special instruments into a fairly coherent and conflict-sensitive set of instruments. After a difficult period under Rajapakse, the EU-Sri Lanka cooperation got momentum again, though the size of the development programme is small compared to major donors like the ADB, Japan and the World Bank.

All in all it can be concluded that the EU has become a more articulated donor vis-à-vis Sri Lanka as being a country in conflict or – as of more recent – a country in a post-conflict trajectory. It has adapted its programmes, made them conditional and conflict sensitive, withhold trade preferences and has argued for human rights, peace, reconciliation and good governance. However, its room of manoeuvre was determined by other actors and this proved to be an unpredictable and volatile experience leading to setbacks and outright failures, like the broadly supported peace process. It appeared impossible to maintain traction with subsequent governments or the LTTE (or for that matter other non-state actors in the East).

Mangala Samaraweera, Sri Lankan Minister of Foreign Affairs, on the left, and Neven Mimica, Member of the EC in charge of International Cooperation and Development, prior to inaugurating the new EU delegation office in Colombo.
8. EU support for Justice and Security Sector Reform in Honduras and Guatemala

Author: Dr. Chris van der Borgh – Utrecht University, The Netherlands

This Desk Study reviews the literature on EU programmes that supported security and justice reform in Guatemala and Honduras. The involvement of the European Union (EU) in Central America dates back to the 1980s when wars raged in the isthmus. The (then) European Economic Community (EEC) supported the regional efforts to bring an end to the civil wars. This role as ‘peace actor’ evolved in the post-settlement period of the 1990s when the EU increased its development assistance to the region, while at a later stage an association agreement was signed with the Central American countries.

The objective of this study is to provide insight into the capabilities of the EU in the field of conflict prevention and peacebuilding, on the basis of a screening the existing academic publications, reports, policy documents, evaluations, and journalistic articles. This report discusses two programmes that aim to contribute to security and rule of law reform in Central America: the Programme in Support of the Security Sector (PASS) in Honduras and the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG).

As the PASS programme was created and led by the EU, the reports and evaluations of the programme provide relevant information about the EU efforts to support and push for security sector reform in Honduras. In the case of the CICIG, the specific role played by the EU is hardly discussed in the literature. This is not surprising, since CICIG is a hybrid United Nations (UN) institution, supported (both financially and politically) by a range of international actors – the EU being one of them.

It is interesting to note that both PASS and CICIG took into account many of the characteristics of the ‘comprehensive approach to security’ that the EU adheres to. CICIG as a hybrid institution had a broad mandate, while the objectives of the PASS programme were ‘comprehensive’. However, in both cases it has been argued that the goals were too ambitious. With regard to the PASS programme, various authors are positive about the programme’s design, precisely because the programme took a comprehensive approach, paid due attention to the process of developing a national framework first (in phase 1), was willing to invest a large amount of money in the sectors of security and justice, and took a long term approach. However, in the final report of the PASS programme, the high ambition level of the programme is questioned. CICIG has received similar criticism. This critique implies that there are limits to the agenda that international actors can implement, and that this is still insufficiently recognized. This seems a valid point of critique and is relevant to take into account in the face of ‘overambitious’ programmes that tend to ‘spread too thin’. However, while a clear sense of purpose is a strength, one may also argue that a broad(er) mandate can allow international actors to adapt to changes in the political context.

It is fair to say that, in the case of Honduras, the EU was aware of the need to adapt to the versatile and complex environment and acted on it. The idea of having two phases and the fact that the programme never entered the second phase in which larger investments (35
million Euro) would be made, shows that the EU was aware of the risks and willing and able to conclude that the programme simply didn’t live up to the EU’s expectations. Faced with an extremely complex context, the EU demonstrated a capacity to adapt. Instead of continuing the PASS programme, it started a different, more focussed programme, EuroJusticia. The fact that the EU changed course and decided to invest in a different programme suggests a capacity to revise and redesign its engagement.

The main challenge of both initiatives was the very national political context in which they deployed. Both initiatives programmes relied on local actors in the implementation phases and aimed to strengthen the local government actors in the security and justice sectors. The success of both largely depended on the capacity of PASS and CICIG to cooperate with the right actors, and to counter the ones that were not cooperative to the type of reforms and measures that were proposed. In this regard, the PASS programme faced a very complex situation as a sense of ‘ownership’ was virtually absent within the Honduran government and there was ‘no one to align with’. The national ‘owners’ in charge of national security and justice policies had different ideas, interests and ‘routines’ that were not or only partly in line with the type of reform that the EU promoted. Also, while at a relatively late stage civil society was consulted by staff of the PASS programme, a number of organisations remained sceptical about the programme, that they saw as “a programme to strengthen institutions that had an active role in the 2009 coup d’etat” (Irias 2013, 34). Thus, PASS was not able to forge a reform-oriented coalition in the way that CICIG had done.

In that regard, the case of CICIG had a very different starting point. CICIG was rooted in a civil society initiative in Guatemala that was supported by international actors (Maihold 2016, 13). In that regard, CICIG was not simply an ‘external’ initiative, but the result of a long process of political lobbying to make sure that the Guatemalan government accepted the mission. In terms
of the ownership of the initiative, the discussion in the previous section shows that the support of the Guatemalan government and state apparatus was mixed at best. CICIG has been able to cooperate with reform-oriented actors. However, this cooperation was and remained a ‘tricky balance’, since CICIG had to cooperate with the very elites that it was investigating (Dudley 2016). This also explains why despite successes of CICIG, the prospects for longer term capacity building and longer term reform continue to be problematic. In this regard, the recent mobilization in support of CICIG and against the corrupt are interesting and important. However, the road towards rule of law in Guatemala is still a long one.

While the PASS programme was led and funded by the EU, CICIG received political and financial support from a broad range of actors. It can be argued that in comparison to PASS this ‘teaming up’ of international actors has been crucial for CICIG’s resilience. Indeed, the combination of having a hybrid institution that counts on support from a range of international actors seems to be one of the great strengths of CICIG. However, while the EU claims that it played a crucial role in supporting CICIG, both politically and financially, there is as of yet very limited information about the precise role played by the EU, for instance about the ways in which the EU lobbied for the continuation of CICIG. Nevertheless, the choice of the EU to support CICIG from its very start points at the EU’s capacity to align with other influential actors, both at the national and international level.
Thematic Reports on good practices

9. ICTs & EU civilian peacebuilding: Reflections on good practices, opportunities and challenges

**Author:** Jennifer Gaskell – Build Up, England

This reflection report regarding the use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) within civilian peacebuilding was compiled by LSE, together with Build Up. It contains challenges that the EU faces in operationalising the uses of ICTs for conflict prevention and peacebuilding, some examples of the recognition that innovative forms of engagement supported by new technologies can enhance peacebuilding and conflict prevention initiatives and concrete policy recommendations. The report on the one hand is based on good practices and challenges which were discussed at The Community of Practice event organised in Brussels on 23 June 2016 entitled “EU Capabilities in Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding: Roundtable on Uses of ICTs for EU Conflict Prevention & Peacebuilding”. On the other hand it is based on two concrete examples of good practices by small NGOs that have included ICTs in their peacebuilding activities with positive impacts. These are Sisi ni Amani in Kenya (SNA-K) and Elva in Georgia. The report serves to complement the findings of case studies of specific EU interventions and should be read in conjunction with the case study reports on Ukraine, Georgia, Yemen and Mali.

Thus far, little had been published in terms of the EU's perspective on the topic of ICTs for peacebuilding despite investment in innovation, for example through the Digital Agenda for Europe. The role of ICTs in peacebuilding includes the ways peacebuilding actors have used data, communication, networking and mobilisation technologies to support their peacebuilding activities.

In response to the 2007-2008 post-election violence, SNA-K developed the idea of using a combination of traditional and innovative communication and dialogue approaches in order to increase civic education and engagement, as well as to prevent violence in Kenyan communities before, during, and after Kenya’s 2013 General Election. The initiative made strategic use of an SMS-based platform that reached over 65,000 Kenyans.

Elva’s PeacePark in Georgia fosters intercultural youth dialogue through online gaming for peace and conflict prevention. This was an answer to the absence of an agreement between Georgia, Russia and the regional governments in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In this case physical and political barriers were overcome through ICTs. In close collaboration with local games designer, Elva developed an online game called PeacePark where players are challenged to restore peace in a communal park by understanding visitor’s interests and making wise decisions.

The Whole of Society approach means that peacebuilding and conflict prevention processes should be inclusive of a wide range of actors – and deals with the practicalities of ensuring a coherent and effective approach. Examples can be found of organisations...
implementing ‘peacetech’\(^1\) projects in a way coinciding with the Whole of Society approach in a responsible, effective and impactful way. This report shows that ‘peacetech’ has the potential not only to be an additional tool in the EU’s – and other actors’ – peacebuilding and conflict prevention toolkits, but it can also enhance the capability to adopt a Whole of Society approach.

Both examples presented highlight the potential to reach a far greater number of people in a more responsive manner, as well as the ability to overcome physical and political challenges to peace through the uses of ICTs. This can have significant effects on the inclusion of a much wider range of voices, including marginalised and youth groups. This is also emphasised by the processes that are recommended to implement ‘peacetech’ initiatives: participatory, user-centred design, local ownership and sustainability, through infrastructure or by fostering local innovation, conflict sensitivity (doing no harm) and learning and adaption from other contexts. Finally, one key potential highlighted by several interviewees is the opportunity to connect different initiatives for continuity and knowledge sharing, thus providing better practical coordination and overall strategic coherence.

Two of the concrete recommendations provided in the report are the following: 1) the EU needs to engage with the ‘peacetech’ community to better understand the value of the uses of ICTs in peacebuilding and conflict prevention; and 2) from a Whole of Society approach, ICTs should be used by the EU’s peacebuilding and conflict prevention practice as it bridges the (vertical) gap between grassroots/community and political processes. Herein it must be noted that the use of ICTs implies the challenge of undertaking coherent implementation at the political and grassroots levels.

\(^{1}\) ‘Peacetech’ we use as an umbrella term to refer to activities or initiatives that use technology strategically to help build peace, interchangeably with ‘ICTs for peacebuilding’.

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Acol Aguer Aguer, Nyanut Manot Thilk and Ajok Kual Ding, community filmmakers in Majok Nyithiou, South Sudan. March 2015.
10. Local Ownership Challenges in Peacebuilding and Conflict Prevention

Authors: Dr. Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic, Dr. Mary Martin – London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), UK

This reflection report about challenges of local ownership in peacebuilding and conflict prevention was compiled by LSE and contains an analysis of the European Union’s (EU) ability to leverage the density and complexity of local society and build positive social capital in response to conflict.

The report has two purposes: firstly to provide a perspective on how local ownership is approached in the practice of peacebuilding and conflict prevention by looking at the implementation challenge of local ownership, assessing what actors in addition to the EU do to achieve this normative goal, and investigating practice beyond the four countries covered by the WOSCAP project. In addition to desk research which encompassed academic literature, policy reports produced by international organisations, think tanks, and documents circulated by the major international organisations, the report draws on a Community of Practice event among experts and policy makers in London which discussed comparative perspectives on local ownership in external interventions.

The second purpose is to review the practice of local ownership through the prism of a Whole of Society approach to conflict prevention and peacebuilding. In this regard the report draws on fieldwork conducted in Ukraine and the Community of Practice roundtable discussion held in Kiev among practitioners, policy-making and academic representatives.

Group meeting in Malawi with members of Village Savings and Loan Association (VSL), international NGOs and EC representatives.
These two purposes follow two perspectives, one of which is a problem solving perspective whilst the other questions at a deeper level how local ownership is constructed as a practice and discourse within EU civilian peacebuilding and conflict prevention policies. From this more fundamental perspective, which reflects a Whole of Society approach to EU peacebuilding and conflict prevention capabilities, local ownership is proposed as a deep engagement, a ‘thick conversation’ between locals and external peacebuilders, which takes account of the diversity and complexity of actors, processes and relationships and the multiple positions each constituency adopts towards the conflict.

In this report we question how effectively EU policies map onto this local diversity, and complexity and how they chime with local response mechanisms. By focusing on the examples of the private sector and religious organisations, we have shown the presence and significance of a dense and complex local ecology of conflict responses, conflict perceptions and expectations, which currently is not reflected in EU interventions. The examples of these two marginalised groups of local actors, also demonstrate that it is important to recognise not only proximate actors in the conflict space such as NGOs and government elites, but also mid-range actors who can bridge between grassroots and elite levels, provide different kind of information about the conflict, and variegated and adaptable responses.

The report’s main finding is that external peacebuilding tends to focus on and privilege a relatively narrow group of locals, which can be characterised as government and non-government elites, while marginalising important constituencies which are outside these categories. Therewith, existing approaches to local ownership fail to capture – or sometimes even acknowledge – the deep-seated difficulties of aligning with the variegated and fluid nature of local society, and its creative possibilities. Based on the given examples, the Whole of Society perspective suggests that the promise of local ownership in international interventions is best served through identifying appropriate spaces of action within local society, and an adjustment of programming parameters to enable the EU to complement the efforts of domestic actors.
11. Civil-Military Synergy at Operational Level in EU External Action

Author: Dr. Shyamika Jayasundara-Smits – Global Partnership of the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC), The Netherlands

This thematic report reflects on the challenges found in trying to enhance civil-military synergies in European Union’s (EU) interventions, and identifies opportunities based on the experiences of practitioners on good and bad practices at the operational level. The report was compiled by GPPAC and puts forward several key recommendations for effective civil-military synergies in EU external missions. These recommendations are grounded on secondary data collected through an extensive phase of desk-based research, as well as empirical data which has been collected during a series of face-to-face engagements with policymakers in Brussels, practitioners of civil and military backgrounds, including those who have served in Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions, individual country level peace missions and multinational peace operations.

Although it remained undefined, since the Nice European Council meeting held in 2000, civil-military synergies have become a serious goal of the EU’s approach to crisis management and peacebuilding. The EU’s dedicated search for civil-military synergy, especially at the operational level, is related to two intertwined imperatives. First, related to the changes in the broader context of security and the new and renewed threats to security and peace at a global scale. And second, related to the declining resource base of the EU member states. Currently, Europe is faced with a twisted dilemma as to how to upgrade its defence capabilities and defence capacities and more importantly, how to achieve them at a lower cost. The EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy (2016) reaffirmed that synergy across EU policies, capabilities and instruments of external action is crucial for the EU’s credibility, effectiveness and smooth functioning of the Comprehensive Approach (CA) and the CSDP.

First, this report navigates the conceptual fuzziness surrounding the term ‘civil-military synergy’ at strategic and operational levels in the EU. At the level of practice, lacking a clear definition on civil-military synergies at the EU strategic level is not thought to be a major impediment. The lack of clear definition even partly contributes to the flexibility of a mission and therewith helps to swiftly navigate, judge and act on different complex dynamics in the operational ground and to seize opportunities arising on a day-to-day basis. For the practitioners, the ill-functioning of the CA is the major impediment for effective operations and one that prevents civil-military synergies at the operational level.
Based on practitioners’ first hand field level experiences, civil-military synergies are more likely to occur in short term missions (i.e., stabilization) with clearly defined mission goals, often carried out in a less crowded operational environment and under a clear command structure and leadership. Grounded in the key learning from these short term missions, practitioners underline the need for improved resources (materially, financially as well as human) and their timely mobilization and flexibility of deployment. They regard processes of coordination, cooperation and coherence of the EU’s capabilities throughout the operational cycle of a mission and beyond, as key for fostering civil-military synergies at the operational level. From a practice perspective, setting smaller aims and corresponding steps as well as action points enable situations of effective civil-military interfaces. Further, trust building and networking in regular and complex mission environments were identified as an important precondition for civil-military synergy at the operational level.

The key recommendations for effective civil-military synergies at the operational level in EU external missions and the concrete steps the EU can take to foster civil-military synergies, are built upon the Whole of Society approach. The first recommendation in this regard is adopting a ‘politics matter-people matter’ approach. Second, ‘mak[ing] the EU’s comprehensive approach actually comprehensive in action and fully functional while avoiding ‘reinventing the wheel’. Last but not least, recognising and acting upon the primacy of local ownership. Taking into account the ‘Whole of Society’ approach, the demand for increased efforts to embed local realities, working together with local populations; including the non-state local actors and benefiting from their knowledge, power relationships and networks is crucial. In its final conclusion, from the vantage point of capability development, this report offers suggestions on how to operationalise these three main recommendations and provides steps the EU should take to foster civil-military synergies at the operational level.
12. Strengthening the EU Multi-stakeholder coherence in peacebuilding and conflict prevention: examples of good practices

Authors: Prof. PhD Linda Benraïs, Julie Simon, MSc – Institute for Research and Education on Negotiation (ESSEC IRENE), France

This report reflecting on good practices was compiled by ESSEC IRENE and is based on a deeper analysis of the main findings of the WOSCAP Scoping Study on Multi-stakeholder coherence and on additional research. The report focuses on two axes. First, on a reflection on coherence within European Union (EU) institutions, especially regarding the role of the EU Delegation could play for the implementation of a Multi-stakeholder approach. The second axis is focused on the actors the EU collaborates with. In this sense it is noteworthy that depending on the EU’s definition of CSOs, critical actors such as the private sector and faith based actors are in most cases neglected or absent from peace negotiation processes in EU's policies. This research axis, in addition to other research, was informed by findings generated through an event organized by ESSEC IRENE on 23 June 2016 in Brussels. The event was titled “Civil Society, Private Sector, Economic Diplomacy — Questioning the Coherence of the EU External Action in Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding” and provided the opportunity for dialogue between EU officials, representatives of CSO’s and academic researchers. Further, this report provides a basis for future publications and concrete recommendations to the EU and also addresses the opportunity for future cooperation of the EU with the private sector and faith-based actors in peacebuilding and conflict prevention.

Coherence can and should be increased through the adoption of a global approach to conflicts, which means linking peacebuilding and conflict prevention measures to other implemented policies, especially development and humanitarian policies, bringing credibility and legitimacy to the political role of the EU in conflict areas. In contributing to Multi-stakeholder coherence, the EU provides some significant advantages. One is due to the diversity within the EU’s system, network and instruments itself, as its added value relies on its versatility and allows the adaptation to changing situations while implementing conflict prevention and peacebuilding processes. Further, the EU Delegation has a privileged position on the ground, as they have the means and opportunities to establish relations and reach relevant local actors in the civil society.

Within the EU’s contribution to a Multi-stakeholder approach, two main best practices may be identified: information sharing and burden sharing. Pooling of resources strengthens the conflict analysis, which is key to act coherently and to establish appropriate burden sharing between the EU’s entities. However, information sharing is still a challenge when dealing with high sensitive and political topics, and in large countries where EU Member States have strategic interests. Burden-sharing, first and foremost, builds upon a good overview of both the EU projects implemented on the ground as well as of the links that can be made between them and other projects in order to avoid overlaps. Further, mutual understanding and improved communication are necessary in order to coordinate agendas and to organise regular meetings.
In this regard, researchers as well as practitioners stressed that good communication and information sharing depends mostly on the individual attitude and past experience of the Head of Delegation, the EU Delegation staff, and the European Commission (EC), especially in crisis context (Helly et al. 2015).

Another dimension highlighted in the report focuses on the role played by the private sector and faith-based actors in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. A number of organisations have implemented a series of good practices, including conflict analysis, mediation, inclusive dialogue and the use of political, social or economic influence. Integrating the private sector in peace processes means taking advantage of a multi-faceted actor. The private sector has to be recognised as both a peace and a conflict driver, and with certain impact on the context and actors involved. Therefore, its inclusion in the peacebuilding and mediation processes appears to be a necessity. The EU has already built partnerships with companies based on the Corporate and Social Responsibility (CSR) policy. However, in order to adopt an effective multi-stakeholder coherence, their cooperation should go beyond CSR and link with peace and conflict prevention.

Another dimension this report deals with is the cooperation with faith-based organisations (FBO) which entails an entry point for engaging with all layers of society, as faith-based actors can also be important peace drivers. However, one obstacle in this regard is the lack of a clear definition of what is considered an FBO and therewith the lack of clear guidelines available for the EU on how to engage with those actors as insider mediators in conflict situations.

Further, the report contains an overview of good practices on coherence in conflict prevention and peacebuilding and provides insight into the relevance of the EU’s role in terms of a Multi-stakeholder approach in the case of Kenya during the 2013 elections and in the case of the EU’s involvement in the Mindanao region.

Christos Stylianides (member of the EC in charge of Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management) meeting with the representatives of Save the children and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), during his visit in Lebanon.
13. The Role of the EU and Other Third Parties in Promoting the Gender, Peace and Security Agenda in Mediation and Dialogue Processes

Authors: Pamela Urrutia, María Villellas and Ana Villellas – Escola de Cultura de Pau (ECP), Spain

This Reflection Report was compiled by ECP and analyses lessons learned and good practices in introducing a gender perspective to peace processes in order to strengthen the European Union’s (EU) capabilities in Multi-track diplomacy (MTD). Further, it reflects on various practical experiences by the EU and other third parties in the area of gender and MTD in two spheres: First, the gender dimension in EU’s role as a mediator/facilitator. This report analyses issues like challenges and dilemmas of mediation from a gender perspective; complementarity and coordination in MTD from a gender perspective and the availability of gender-responsive mediators. Secondly, the report focuses on EU’s actions via other types of engagement (promoting, supporting, leveraging and funding), like political support for women’s involvement in peace processes, financial and technical support to empower women and strengthen local women’s organisations and financial support for capabilities in the area of gender and third-party mediation.

This report is based on the findings presented in the Scoping Study on gender and further desk research and several conducted interviews. In addition, this report was enriched by a Community of Practice seminar held in Barcelona on 22 September 2016, in which different stakeholders participated, including EU officials and civil society representatives.

EU’s policy on gender and MTD is part of the global development of the women, peace and security (WPS) agenda after the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security in 2000. MTD is one of the core items on the WPS agenda, which establishes in different Security Council resolutions women’s significant and equal participation in peace processes, an increase in the number of female mediators and the introduction of a gender perspective to all MTD efforts as priorities. The EU’s Comprehensive Approach identifies peace processes as opportunities to promote women’s empowerment, gender equality, gender mainstreaming and respect for women’s rights.” However, many challenges can be identified such as the mediator’s political will and/or ability to include a gender perspective, the possibility of reservations of negotiating parties or those of third parties and the questions about how to conduct gender-responsive mediation in practice. One important element related to gender-sensitive mediation refers to the availability of gender mediators and expertise. In this regard it is important to bolster the resources available and ensure its integration.
MTD is an entry point with enormous potential for the EU to engage with gender in wider peacebuilding and conflict prevention efforts, as it can have a positive impact in other areas such as Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Governance reform as a result of its specific inclusion in peace negotiations and agreements. Moreover, the EU’s range of actors and their vast geographical presence create windows of opportunity which in several cases can be taken advantage of more effectively.

The report draws on various examples in which the EU has played the role as a mediator and/or co-mediator such as in Mali, Georgia and Yemen. The National Dialogue Conference (NDC) in Yemen for instance serves as a best practice of a process in which third parties played a key role to ensure women’s participation. It is considered that one of the lessons of the NDC is that gender inequality and cultural objections can be overcome by sustained pressure by local women’s movement and international actors.

Another example provided in this report is Colombia. This case serves as a best practice in terms of how to achieve integration of the gender dimension in multiple aspects of a peace process, as well as the importance of coordination between the different stakeholders involved and of consistency throughout the different aspects of a peace process.

Drawing on these and several other examples, this report concludes with concrete recommendations on how the EU can improve its contribution of women’s participation both in peace negotiations as well as in wider fields such as SSR. In this regard, the EU lacks a systematic approach that places gender at the centre of its interventions which also results in the weakening of the EU’s potential to reinforce its profile more broadly as a civilian peacebuilding actor.