Community of Practice Roundtable: Civil-Military Synergies in EU Action

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Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict
COMMUNITY OF PRACTICE ROUNDTABLE: CIVIL-MILITARY SYNERGIES IN EU ACTION

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Deliverable 4.4: Community of Practice Event on Civil-military synergies
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Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict

Whole of Society Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding

This report summarizes the outcomes of the WOSCAP Community of Practice roundtable discussion on civil-military synergies in EU action held on 26 September in The Hague, The Netherlands. This meeting took place in the context of the EU-funded Whole of Society Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding project, aimed at enhancing the EU’s conflict prevention and peacebuilding capabilities. It also includes brief summaries of two other meetings that GPPAC co-organised this year on related topics, which also contribute to the outcomes and community of practice. GPPAC aims to identify (best) practices on both a strategic and operational level in civil-military synergies and cooperation that are relevant for the EU, including examples from other actors such as the UN. In our quest for answers, we invited practitioners and experts on civil-military cooperation to provide feedback on specific questions and input as to what evidence of relevant practices there is which may be taken beyond ad hoc initiatives.

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Introduction

In the Whole of Society Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding project, GPPAC is leading on the theme of civil-military synergies and SSR ‘cluster’ in reviewing EU action in peacebuilding and conflict prevention. GPPAC had multiple engagements over 2016 aimed at engaging specific individuals working on this topic and existing communities of practice. Although it was originally envisaged to have one event on the “civil-military synergies” theme, GPPAC’s efforts did not focus on one meeting, alongside the ongoing research into the topic. Therefore, this report D4.4 also briefly mentions two other relevant meetings it organised to engage a community of practice, also on the topic of SSR, which is closely intertwined with – and relevant to – the discussions on civil-military capabilities and synergies, and EU capabilities.

This report is about three relevant meetings GPPAC has organised in this regard.

1. Community of Practice roundtable: Civil-Military Synergies in EU Action (26 September 2016)
2. Civil Society Dialogue Network (CSDN) Member State Meeting (13 April 2016) – p. 7
3. Mali beyond MINUSMA: Which Role for ECOWAS & the EU (14 April 2016) – p. 8

For the latter two events, it is relevant to mention that we invited Professor Kissima Gakou, from the Université des Sciences Juridiques et Politiques de Bamako (USJPB) to participate as a speaker. He is part of the WOSCAP project’s Mali case study research team, specifically researching the EU’s SSR efforts in Mali. This enabled us to discuss the research being done in the WOSCAP project in those meetings, as well as the inclusion of a unique Malian perspective on the EU’s efforts to SSR in Mali.
1. Community of Practice roundtable: Civil-Military Synergies in EU Action

Since the Nice European Council in 2000, civil-military synergy has become a serious persuasion of EU’s approach to crisis management and peacebuilding. This development is influenced by two intertwined imperatives, first, increasing risks for security at global level that demand new configurations in the conventional approaches to crisis management and peace operations and secondly, weakening defence capacities and capabilities of the EU member states due to declining defence expenditure. Without doubt, finding synergy between the civil-military actors, actions and approaches at strategic and operational levels are not only about improving the functionality of the EU’s crisis management and peacebuilding approach. They are also about boosting EU’s preferred image of being a serious and effective security actor at global level. The EU has indicated in its Global Strategy document that it wants to go in this direction, but questions remain as to how and what this means for conflict prevention. How is it related to the “integrated approach”? And what experiences could be relevant for the EU? Are there examples that demonstrate civilian and military “synergy” and is this term useful?

Objectives

- In the context of the "Whole of Society Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding" project, GPPAC aims to identify (best) practices on both a strategic and operational level in civil-military synergies / cooperation that are relevant for the EU, including examples from other actors such as the UN. Specific countries of interest are Mali, Ukraine, Georgia and Yemen.

- Review and critical reflection on "best practices and lessons learned". It seems that good practices often remain ad hoc, under specific circumstances, which can fall under civil-military cooperation, but do not perhaps provide evidence of synergy taking place, or institutionalized forms of this. In our quest for answers, we invited practitioners and experts on this to provide feedback on our questions and input as to what evidence there is of relevant practices that may be taken beyond ad hoc initiatives.

- The notion of civil-military synergies needs to be unpacked in order to be meaningful, especially in the context of the EU’s “integrated” or “comprehensive” approach.

Discussion questions

The roundtable was set up around the three questions below to get a concrete and focused discussion and answers. This section summarizes the main points of the outcomes per discussion question.

1) Concept: What (outcomes) do civil and/or military actors refer to as ‘synergy’? Does the word ‘synergy’ exist in their standard vocabularies especially at operational level?
In the “EU language”, there are a lot of different terms being used: multi-stakeholder coherence, CIMIC, CIMCO, comprehensive approach, integrated approach and others. Are all the approaches together synergy or is it something else? What is missing is the working definition of ‘synergy’ (in EU context). The EU does not ‘define'; which may be deliberate.

A lot of problems identified relate to the proliferation of actors. An increasing number of actors (such as private companies, contractors, and others) and their identities, values, rules of engagements, prejudices, goals, and agendas complicate any kind of synergy or cooperation further. This is applicable to both civil and military actors; i.e. in Iraq, some play both roles. In addition, where do we place the police, when its role is sometimes not strictly civilian or military, or when the military performs policing tasks?

What examples did we find so far? The CSDP mission on anti-piracy, which was based on NATO rules, was indicated as an actual example at the level of synergy. Another illustration of a good practice that demonstrated synergy was the Dutch mission in Uruzgan. In this mission, the Dutch military did cooperate with local organisations, but due to the specific sensitive context it could not publically report on these specific examples.

It was pointed out that perhaps there are many examples, but not at the level of synergy, more at the level of ad hoc or informal cooperation and coordination. On another level there are institutionalized forms of cooperation / collaboration, for example to increase accountability and effectiveness.

It was emphasised that it could be a risk for the civilian actors to formalise this kind of ad hoc cooperation that has led to some level of synergy. A participant underlined that synergy should never be in an institutionalised form, but rather informal. He explained that informal synergy exists, but it is not documented and synergy may occur more at micro level activities than on the overall goal (strategic) level.

A good practice of an institutionalised form of civil-military cooperation was in The Philippines, where the oversight mechanism of the military which includes civil society organisations has been institutionalised.

Often, synergy or cooperation happened informally. For example, French and local CSOs played a role in informing the local populations in Northern Mali about the French intervention before they came. It demonstrated the importance of having an awareness of each other strengths. Nevertheless, the details of this example could not be publically mentioned.

A participant shared their experience in Syria in civil-civil coordination, using civil society as an interlocutor.

One of the suggestions was that the approach can be formalised within (military) institution on how to communicate with civil society to understand in which situation cooperation did work and in which not.

The EU should also look at the discussion the UNOCHA had 20 years ago on CIMCO. UN-CMCoord use intermediaries to bridge some conflicts. The EU can consider how the UN organised the clusters in different fields. The civilian part of the integrated mission is a link between military and NGOs. This can help in structuring coordination.
A number of concrete examples from Mali and Bosnia were named, exemplifying the successful stories that do not make it into official reports. This is due to the sensitive nature of these interactions, whereby some actors cannot publicly acknowledge their contribution or interaction. The success of synergy does not come from the top, but from the bottom up and it remains at the operational level.

It was also underlined that in the process of developing the EU SSR framework, the focus was mostly on civilian actors. The question was how to set up the strategy and the framework. The Netherlands and Slovakia pushed for including a military perspective as well in that process.

It was said that synergy cannot be planned, what can be planned is coordination, trust building, joint assessment, planning and thereby, leading up to synergy.

2) Practice: What do civil and/or military actors regard as concrete examples where synergy has taken place; and (if there is any) what are the underlying factors in each of those situations that they think made ‘civil-military synergy’ possible?

It is relevant to recognize the whole set of actors such as: police, international military groups, local governance, and international NGOs. Non-humanitarian, non-state, local actors should be identified.

There are positive lessons learned in Sierra Leone and Burundi on SSR. It is possible to dig into the civil-military aspects of these missions and on the military component. Some of the lessons are not civil-military engagement, but the involvement of the local population in the preparation of programs. Liberia was cited as a good example where women’s groups did DDR, something which other actors could not achieve.

The conditions that enable civil-military synergy possible depend on a specific context and individual efforts. A military representative (with experience in MINUSMA) explained that it took a lot of work in establishing network with civilian department at the UN and developing relationship with OCHA. And building on that, where military action could complement the civilian needs. His successor did not keep up the network. This demonstrates why the transfer of experience to another context is difficult. A formal cooperation network can be set, but still it is not enough as it requires trust building (and trust cannot be transferred). Rotation of staff is very problematic as often the success of these relations comes down to the individual persons. It is about ensuring the sustainability of missions and interventions. A participant highlighted the importance of working towards the SDG Goal 16.

It was recommended to look at what is being done within EU militaries; to look at stream of military, and to find the means for a longer term engagement. Is there a way to capitalize on the EU defence attaché system? Or a stream that militaries after 12 months leave, but later can come back? Some of the participants expressed that the EU defence system could have a military attaché as part of the EU country delegation and not in national framework, so that it does not have national caveats. The defence attaché could advise at earlier stages on conflict prevention/analysis. These personnel can be drawn from ex-staff/retired military personnel, and should be integrated as EU diplomats. This was proposed as a potential remedy to the abovementioned challenge of the short rotation periods of military staff.
With regards to the trainings and capacity building, it was underlined that within the military there is a challenge of developing an adequate skill set. A military representative mentioned that it is very difficult to find good instructors. Therefore, they need to be less selective and lower the requirements. The lacking capacity and human resources should be a serious point of attention.

The idea of a stream within the military could be to build up a specific skill set and to think of conflict prevention scenarios from the beginning. It would be useful to start looking early on (from the start of their military career) at who could potentially be suitable for certain tasks.

As civil-military issues are mostly a global North / Western concept, it is relevant to include the perspectives from actors who do not come from EU countries (global south).

The question that arose was where to place the police in civil-military relationship, as they are performing tasks that touch on both civil and military components. It was also mentioned that civilians can learn from the military as well, to understand the military perspective on the consequences of a mission.

3) **What lessons or opportunities are relevant in your view for the EU to enhance its capabilities, either civilian or military, in the field of peacebuilding and conflict prevention?**

- The EU should look at the UN in Mali as there are a lot of difficulties in coordination. Next to the military CSDP mission of the EU (EUTM), MINUSMA is also working on SSR.

- As a concrete recommendation to the Conflict-Prevention Unit at the EEAS, would be to look at the capacities they have on conflict sensitivity and conflict analysis, and whom they provide the training to. Does it include the military part of CSDP missions? Include civil society? It is quite specific, but meaningful to explore.

- On the SSR framework, different EU institutions are involved and it already helps. Having discussions during seminars clarifies how they work and reinforce each other (inter-agency understanding). Cooperation and inter-operability should be improved.

- A joint assessment exercise on a specific country could be done, by involving the EU and civil society. It should be looked at whether there is capacity to do an experimental exercise with CSDP mission. The idea is long-term effectiveness.

- There is an opportunity to look at joint indicators for monitoring and evaluation, and an opportunity to work on these issues together with OECD. It is important to ensure that what is done is releasable to the public.

- Looking at civil-military local programs is important as well as designing a theory of change. It was suggested that the EU should also look at the NCDC and to do it from bottom up approach. The process of doing it jointly might be useful. It is important to define what the roles for both sides are and to clarify what both sides can gain from.

- A concrete suggestion was made to refer to the DPKO who are working on a report with relevant recommendations on how to relate to civil society, which can be useful for the EU.
- Institutionalising learning that feeds into accountability and at operational level. It should be in the host country and regional organisation(s) experienced in this field.
- When there is low intensity conflict, the local groups should be heard on what they need and what they are used to do by themselves (local mechanisms). The EU must understand their own institutions, who does what, and get Members States to act together.
- Not to reinvent the wheel; the EU can learn from the UN, for example at how UNOCHA is organised and the process by which it was set up.
- It is important to engage with locals, find opportunities, make an impact, respect, and recognise the local groups. The EU deals with national level, but for success local government is key. This was proven in Iraq.

Outcomes will feed into:

1. A report on the topic of civil-military synergies which will be delivered to the European Commission, to be published in December 2016, in the context of the WOSCAP project.
2. It is an opportunity to provide recommendations on the implementation of the Global Strategy on these topics.
3. Examples of practices and cases will be included in the database of the project (living document) online, and into online discussions.
4. The outcomes of these community of practice discussions will be included in the final research report of the WOSCAP project (April 2017).

Please see Annex 1 for the Agenda of the meeting.
2. Civil Society Dialogue Network (CSDN) Member State Meeting

On 13 April, the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC), EPLO and Cordaid, co-organised the event on "The EU and the Netherlands’ engagement on fragility: Building on the 2030 Agenda", with the goal of gathering analysis and recommendations from civil society on the implementation of Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 by the EU and its Member States, with a focus on statebuilding and SSR initiatives. The meeting was held in The Hague and brought together approximately 40 participants, including representatives of civil society peacebuilding organisations, and officials from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the EU institutions.

Professor Kissima Gakou, from the Université des Sciences Juridiques et Politiques de Bamako (USJPB), participated in this meeting and the one on 14 April. He is part of the WOSCAP project’s Mali case study research team, and is specifically conducting research into the EU’s SSR efforts in Mali. It enabled us to introduce the WOSCAP project objectives and to share and discuss some of the early observations at the start of the Mali case research.

During the meeting, the session on Promoting conflict-sensitive statebuilding addressed options for SDG 16 implementation, underlining how this could contribute to conflict-sensitive statebuilding, support institutions that are accountable and respond to citizens’ security concerns. Lessons learned from SSR and Train & Equip initiatives were formulated and discussed by means of case studies from Burundi and Mali. Overall, the main outcomes included the need for local ownership and the inclusion of non-state actors, in particular civil society, to ensure accountability and transparency in statebuilding processes. CSDP missions’ mandates should be framed in a way that enables them to have a lasting effect. The full meeting report and recommendations to improve the EU’s support to SSR can be found on the website indicated below. Participants made the following recommendations to the EU and the Member States with regard to Mali:

- International support for SSR in Mali needs to be better informed by realities on the ground. Understanding the local context is essential before any international intervention takes place.
- Better coordination is necessary between EU’s ongoing CSDP missions in Mali, i.e. EUTM Mali and EUCAP Sahel Mali.
- In Mali, some sort of support also needs to be directed towards peaceful, moderated Islamic organisations because they can counter-balance the influence of extremist ideologies on the educational system of the country.

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1 To read more about his intervention, Prof. Gakou drafted a short article outlining his contribution in preparation for this meeting, which can be read in WOSCAP Working Paper 2-3 (Deliverable 6.5).
3 Ibid
3. Mali beyond MINUSMA: Which Role for ECOWAS & the EU

On 14 April, GPPAC initiated an informal meeting "Mali beyond MINUSMA: Which Role for ECOWAS & the EU", which was hosted by GPPAC and the Knowledge Platform Security and Rule of Law in The Hague. Professor Kissima Gakou from USJPB and Mr. Chukwuemeka Eze (Executive Director – West Africa Network for Peacebuilding, WANEP) took part in a discussion with members of the Knowledge Platform. As MINUSMA faces challenges in the implementation of its mandate, the question that was addressed is "Which credible institutional framework can adequately support reconciliation and human security, in particular upon MINUSMA’s eventual departure from Mali?". The participants discussed about lessons learned from MINUSMA (relevant to the EU), outstanding SSR challenges, and the role ECOWAS and the EU missions should play. The full meeting report, including some of lessons learned from MINUSMA for ECOWAS is available at the link provided.\(^4\)

**The role of the European Union and outstanding SSR challenges**

- While generally there has been more attention to MINUSMA than to the EU, its contributions should be adequately assessed to improve coherence and impact of interventions. Indeed, the EU Training Mission for the Malian military (focused on combat), is perceived to lack alignment with the local operational context of terrorism, both in the North and in Bamako.
- Meanwhile, EUCAP, the EU’s civil security mission, is felt to have provided training on ways of working which were not understood by the Malians in their context, and hence, have not been implemented.
- Most recently, the EU’s SSR mission has been deployed but has been inactive as both the Malian army and the police are already in the process of being reformed, and the government has convinced its international partners that the reintegration of former combatants, through the newly established National Commissions on DDR and Integration, must take place before SSR can proceed. The EU shall therefore think creatively about its interventions and where and how exactly SSR will occur.

The conclusion was that as neither France nor MINUSMA are however seen as credible international actors by some Malians, the EU in particular would possibly be well placed to respond to on-going SSR challenges, on the condition that it moves beyond the respective interests of its member States and internal dissent, and finds solutions that are in line with local needs. Its significant neutrality, power, and relatively new role account for its potential.\(^5\)

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\(^4\) Mali beyond MINUSMA: Which Role for ECOWAS & the EU. Knowledge Platform and GPPAC. 14 April 2016, http://www.kpsrl.org/browse/browse-item/t/mali-beyond-minusma-which-role-for-ecowas-the-eu

\(^5\) Ibid
AGENDA
WOSCAP Community of Practice Roundtable: Civil-Military Synergies in EU Action?

Date and time:
26 September 2016
14:00 – 16:30

Venue:
GPPAC Global Secretariat, Laan van Meerdervoort 70
The Hague, The Netherlands

Organised by the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC)
Agenda

Facilitation: Gabriella Vogelaar, Project Manager WOSCAP, GPPAC

14:00 – 14:10 | Welcome and Introductions

14:10 – 14:25 | Introduction to the meeting and WOSCAP project
   Current policy discussions at the EU level
   Gabriella Vogelaar, Project Manager WOSCAP, GPPAC

14:25 – 14:35 | Experiences from GPPAC’s work on the comprehensive approach
   - Jenny Aulin, Managing Adviser - Human Security

14:35 – 14:50 | What we have found on “civil-military synergies” in EU action so far
   - Dr. Shyamika Jayasundara (PhD), International Institute of Social Studies (ISS)

14:50 – 15:15 | Discussion question 1: Civil-Military Synergies concept

15:15 – 15:30 | Coffee break

15:30 – 16:00 | Discussion question 2: Practice: Lessons learned?

16:00 – 16:30 | Discussion question 3: Opportunities

16:30 – 17:00 | Concluding remarks, suggestions and inputs

17:00 – | Drinks