EU and Security Sector Reform: Tilting at Windmills?

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Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict
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Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict

Whole of Society Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding

This scoping study was produced as part of the project “Whole of Society Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding”, which aims to enhance the EU’s peacebuilding and conflict prevention capabilities.

This paper is part of the first series of orientation papers that were intended to indicate lines of inquiry and propose research questions, as a basis for discussion and input for the project’s Theoretical and Methodological Framework. They seek to provide an overview of scholarly knowledge about the EU’s capabilities and means for conflict prevention and peacebuilding in relation to several cross-cutting themes and clusters that the project focuses on.

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1. Preface

Since its formation, by undertaking various activities, including the development of relevant policies and carrying out conflict prevention and peacebuilding missions, the EU contributes to the global peacebuilding and conflict prevention. Especially since the last decade, the EU’s comprehensive approach and commitment pledged to human security, is shaping the EU’s key policies and civilian conflict prevention and peacebuilding capabilities and instruments to undertake complex missions in the area of security and justice. In the EU’s civilian conflict prevention and peacebuilding tool kit, Security Sector Reforms (SSR) stands as a key instrument. Overtime, as the EU’s civilian capabilities and the tools gathered prominence, SSR came to be serving as an important cornerstone of many of EU’s external interventions. To date, following up on its commitment to “comprehensive approach” and “sustainable civilian means of peacebuilding and crisis management”, the EU has undertaken 27 SSR missions, 10 of which are ongoing. Although, initially some of these missions did not formally carry a SSR label, most of civilian crisis management operations under ESDP comes under security sector, under which support to the military structures, police and judicial sector is extended (for an overview see Nowak 2006; Spence and Fluri 2008).

In light of the above developments, the main objective of this scoping study is to provide an initial orientation to the EU’s Security Sector Reform, by focusing on related policy developments and scholarly knowledge production on SSR. Further, by reviewing a few EU-SSR operational missions, this paper highlights a few key challenges and gaps the EU faces in realizing its SSR goals and, more generally, its civilian peacebuilding and crisis management goals.

This paper is written based on a desk review of literatures, mainly comprising of academic texts and grey literature (policy papers), as well as information gathered by attending recent EU-SSR policy related discussions held in The Hague and in Brussels. Being aware of the fast moving dynamics in the field of security, this paper attempts to capture the more recent (since 2005) state of EU-SSR developments. Although, in this study, the EU is the primary actor under review, given the crowded nature of SSR field, this paper also consulted literatures beyond the EU. Therefore, the key findings in this paper may have applicability to a wide range of security actors.
Executive Summary

Overall, the EU’s approach to civilian peacebuilding and crisis management toolkit, hence security sector reform (SSR) hinges on set of liberal norms. One of the key implications of this particular liberal normative underpinning is the assumption of ‘democratic civil-military relations foster stable societies’. After decades of social engineering, in the Anglo-American context, this assumption became a fact of life. However, outside these regions, these norms – often exported through liberal democratic state building and peacebuilding projects – is met with suspicion and resistance. Further, it has also lead to absence of a shared consensus around the main normative tenet thus often end up becoming exclusive, top-down and unsustainable, in the long run. Emergence of ceremonial, hybrid and frictional security governance arrangements, institutions and practices are few notable outcomes related to this.

The EU’s main approach to SSR heavily relies on the OECD approach. It defined SSR objectives as ‘seeking to increase partner countries’ ability to meet the range of security needs within their societies in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of governance, transparency and the rule of law”. This definition extends well beyond the narrower focus of more traditional security assistance on defence, intelligence and policing, thus leaving a lot of room for devising new policies, instruments and institutions. By mainly drawing from the OECD approach, the EU has been able to impress one with the breadth of SSR related policies, instruments and institutions, yet failed to match this with the depth of the OECD-principles in its operations.

EU-SSR shows a tendency towards applying the traditional, short term, “train and equip” approach, informed by the national security paradigm. This approach focuses on improving the technical capacity of security forces, which are perceived as legitimate security actors. This is in contrast to the OECD’s long term “governance-development” approach informed by the human security paradigm that frames the analysis of security and insecurity and security policy and practice in terms of individuals.

Related to the above, the train and equip model of SSR is often presented as a technical approach. It has proven to be successful in engaging local elites’ political support for SSR interventions. However, this approach does contribute to alteration or sustenance of underlying structures and patterns of power relations among the competing local security actors. Therefore, it cannot escape becoming embroiled in governance/political outcomes. Given this, acknowledging and engaging with the ‘political’ aspects of the “train and equip” approach to SSR is essential, if EU-SSR interventions are to be sustainable.

Contrary to its declared commitment for ‘building legitimacy’ for SSR from the ‘bottom-up’, the EU is more inclined to ‘buy-in’ legitimacy from the ‘top-down’. This is made possible through offering various tangible incentives (i.e. aid, EU membership) to potential security counter parts, who often happen to be the political and military elites in the national state-security system. To a certain extent, this buy-in approach seems to work in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood, where the opportunity and the incentive of gaining EU membership functions as a tangible and desirable outcome for the national politico-military elites. However, in contexts where there are no such concrete dividends are on offer or such offers are distributed in ex-ante manner (especially in fragile political contexts located outside the
European neighbourhood), the EU’s SSR interventions have a less of an appeal and a demand. This raises the question, as to how the EU could build the much needed bottom-up legitimacy for its SSR interventions in fragile contexts, where threats to local, national, regional and international security emanating large?

Undertaking in-depth conflict assessments, engaging with different stages of conflicts and making context specific SSR interventions is crucial. By distinguishing contexts, no-conflict or stable political environments are regarded as more conducive for undertaking SSR interventions; as opposed to post-conflict, on-going conflict and complex fragile political situations. The specific dynamics underlying each of these contexts, is crucial for undertaking successful, relevant and sustainable SSR missions and creating enabling security environments. The EU often undertakes SSR as part of an official process, where there is a formal peace process or a peace agreement in place. Therefore, understanding context specific challenges for undertaking SSR interventions where there is no peace agreement or process is important. To this end, General Petraeus’s statement ‘SSR process as repairing an aircraft while in flight—while being shot at” is worth keeping in mind.

SSR operates in a crowded space. Security space constitutes of many actors, a swathe of activities, norms, policy arenas, sectors and communities of practice. Different dynamics and interactions between the above produce a range of different sub-approaches to SSR. ‘Top-down’, ‘bottom up’ approaches, variants of SSR missions such as GSSR (Netherlands, UK and Sweden) and JSSR, are a few to name here. Besides, other variations based on past colonial divisions, in particular, Francophone and Anglophone variations of EU-SSR interventions are identified. These sub-approaches result in different outcomes in different contexts and make it difficult to assess and measure the success of EU’s SSR interventions. The EU can measure success of SSR in many different ways. For example, when dealing with a ‘top down’ approach, one might ask, how well does the security sector maintain the monopoly of force by overcoming non-state armed groups, and how efficient is the security sector? By contrast, with a ‘bottom up’ approach, one might ask, do civilians feel safe?

The EU has quite a reputation of being incoherent and lacking in coordination. They are mostly blamed on the EU’s institutional structure split between the Commission and the Council. The horizontal incoherencies generate by this divided structure have serious implications for SSR operational missions and counter-runs to the EU’s comprehensive approach. Further incoherencies undermine the EU’s overall capability, seriousness, and ‘actoness’ in global security governance arena. Since the establishment of the EEAS in 2010, it is hoped that, in the future, the EU will be able to overcome horizontal and vertical incoherencies and deploy its crisis and peacebuilding intervention capabilities and tools more effectively. Overcoming incoherencies also important to avoid EU-SSR missions becoming deliberate targets of local elites who seek to fulfil narrow power interests.

In SSR studies, there is lack of contribution for theory building and development of robust conceptual and analytical frameworks. Although the evidence base at empirical level on EU-SSR stands rich, more work is needed to turn it into a systematic SSR theory building effort. We trust by inclusion of an explicit and a nuanced political analysis (focuses predominantly on power); and a robust political theory of change as promising directions for theory building and useful future lines of scholarly inquiries.
Organisation of the paper

The EU has a long track record for developing policies, devising tools for addressing and preventing crisis and conflicts through civilian means. These developments and their outcomes warrant constant scrutiny, which this paper attempts to contribute to. In doing so, the rest of this paper is structured as follows: in the next section, the paper traces the genesis of SSR as a concept and unpacks mainstream definitions of Security Sector Reforms borrowed, adapted and applied by the EU. This section features a brief elaboration of the main actors in SSR, and the processes, normative underpinnings, functions and goals. Next, the paper presents a short trajectory of SSR policy developments in the EU. Subsequently, we present a brief overview of the progress of EU-SSR scholarly knowledge. This section also presents a broad methodological map to assess the strengths and weaknesses of existing studies. Then, using a few illustrative examples, the paper discusses a few key gaps and challenges in operationalising SSR. Finally, the paper ends with some concluding remarks and potential lines of inquiries for future EU-SSR research.
2. Security Sector Reforms: Tracing the trajectories of development of a discourse and unpacking concepts, assumptions and their functions

The origins of Security Sector Reform (SSR) can be traced back to late 1990s. It is rooted in the fields of security and development policy. A movement towards founding a more coherent understanding and an international policy on SSR gained momentum during the 1990s when a “new thinking” on security emerged (Barbe, 2012, 168). Same time around, the study of the ‘security sector’ (as opposed to the traditional focus on civil-military relations), became a rapidly emerging field of inquiry in the so-called phase of ‘new aid paradigm’ (Bellamy 2003, 105). This ‘new aid paradigm’ belongs to development studies, security studies and practical policy. Together, these developments led to new ways of pursuing and thinking of security, and laid the foundation for current policies and depth and breadth of SSR activities and instruments deployed by the EU and other prominent security actors. The early emergent SSR model came to be exported as a mainstay of international state-building policy and practice and was increasingly utilised as an approach to effective conflict resolution, post-conflict reconstruction, state building, and democratisation. In the context of the European Union, it is also being utilised as a leitmotif of EU enlargement.

Researchers have traced the conceptual roots of SSR along two different trajectories: the ‘developmentalisation of donor countries’ security discourse, and the ‘securitisation of the development assistance’. For instance, the discourse of ‘securitisation of development assistance’ attempts to make aid and state building more effective in the long term, by integrating the conflict-peace-development agenda and reducing the threats associated with state failures. These developments are perceived as successful scenarios of integration of different levels of policy and different epistemic communities (Faleg 2012, 169). The first trajectory is viewed as a result of the development community’s attempts at increasing its influence in security affairs and instrumental use of security sector for diffusing key norms, namely; transparency, comprehensiveness and systems thinking. Establishing ‘good governance’ is the ultimate goal.

To date, doubts are being raised as to what exactly the ‘security sector’ entails and what activities fall under it. Further, it is noted that many of the EU’s early interventions have not carried an explicit SSR label either. SSR is often used interchangeably with the concept of security sector development (SSD) or Security Sector Transformation (SST). Similarly, SSR programmes are not all the same. However, a general set of goals includes the following:

1. Accountable security sector within a framework of democratic governance and civilian oversight of security sector;
2. Integration of security and development policy;
3. Participatory multi-stakeholder security processes that include civil society, especially women, minority groups, and youth;
4. Non-discriminatory provision of national security and human security goals;
5. Efficient and effective security sector in holding a monopoly of force.
Without limiting to specific types of states or post-conflict contexts where an official peace agreement or a process in place, it is believed that all states must continually strive to develop and professionalize their security sectors.

Only in the last decade, certain EU missions and their various components started getting an explicit SSR labelling. This development highlights the conceptual fuzziness surrounding SSR and the EU’s struggle to define what fits and does not fit under SSR. Some argue, in EU affairs, despite the availability of many terms referring to SSR and their interchangeable use (i.e. system and sector), in the field these different usages make no difference (ADE 2011, 2). However, given the problem of narrowness of all the SSR related terms identified, some suggest “security governance” or “security arena” are better terms to be used (Hills 2014, 166). At the extreme end of SSR’s conceptual and terminological spectrum, “state building” is suggested as a term that best describes what the EU does. Further, what is done in the name of SSR considerably overlaps with the international state building agenda in post-conflict contexts (Egnell and Halden 2009, 28; Dursun-Ozkanca and Vandemoortele 2012, 149). These different views on what SSR is (definitional), what it actually does (functional) and what it should entail (scope) leaves a blurred terrain for investigation. This blurriness is reflected in both policy and practice.

Currently, the EU and many other international security actors draw heavily from the OECD-DAC definition of SSR, “the core security actors (e.g. armed forces, police, gendarmerie, border guards, customs and immigration, and intelligence and security services); security management and oversight bodies (e.g. ministries of defence and internal affairs, financial management bodies and public complaints commissions); justice and law enforcement institutions (e.g. the judiciary, prisons, prosecution services, traditional justice systems); and non-statutory security forces (e.g. private security companies, guerrilla armies and private militia)” (OECD 2005, 5; Dursun-Ozkanca and Vandemoortele 2012, 142-143). The OECD-DAC definition stands as a cornerstone of the ever evolving policies, guidelines and SSR activities. At present, SSR is featured in two key EU policy documents, EU Concept for ESDP Support to Security Sector Reform (2005) – also known as the Council’s Concept – and ‘A Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform’ (2006), known as the Commission’s Concept. In the Commission’s Concept, SSR is defined as “the process of transforming the security system of a state in a manner that is consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributing to a well-functioning security framework”. Other strategic documents, namely; the 2003 European Security Strategy and the 2010 internal EU Concept for the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) Justice Missions (DECAF–IISAT 2015) share a similar understanding of SSR as emanating from the Commission’s definition of SSR. Interestingly, the EU following OECD terminology has also given rise to a specific variant of the EU’s contemporary understanding of SSR, in which ‘multilateralisation’ is a key element (Albrecht 2012, 172).

To-date, frequent references made to the OECD-DAC Guidelines on Security System Reform and Governance (2005), and the guidelines laid out in the OECD Handbook on Security System Reform (2008) seem to serve as the blueprint of SSR thinking and practices of many international security actors; the EU, UN, OSCE and USA. Researchers identify two elements pioneered by the OECD definition that are being shared by these actors, which are: democratic
and civilian control of the security sector, and encouragement for developing effectiveness and efficiency in the security sector (Hanggi undated, 17).

On a positive note, OECD–DAC definition of SSR is being instrumental in generating a shared understanding of the basics of SSR. However, on a critical note, this definition has left out some relevant security actors from the broader security picture. They are non-state (legal and illegal) and informal security actors as well as their institutions and localised, scattered and hybrid forms of security arrangements and practices. Therefore, field missions, operationalising the OECD-DAC definition that excludes the abovementioned actors, face enormous challenges in achieving SSR objectives and prevent taking a realistic assessment of the often chaotic actual security environments that are essential for devising meaningful and sustainable interventions.

The OECD-DAC states that the main objective of SSR is to “create a secure environment which is conducive to development, poverty reduction and democracy” (Skeppström et al. 2015, 355) and that “processes and procedures dedicated to the reform of the security sector,...include all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework” (OECD 2005, 20). Unpacking this definition further reveals four key dimensions of SSR: political, institutional, economic, and societal (Channa 2006, 324). Nevertheless, in practice, the institutional dimension tends to overshadow other dimensions (i.e., societal and political).

Although the EU has inherited some of the handicaps from the OECD-DAC SSR conceptualisation, Dursun-Ozkanca & Vandemoortele note, currently the EU is potentially the most important resource provider for SSR programmes (Dursun-Ozkanca & Vandemoortele 2012, 139). Since the early 2000s, the EU has undertaken SSR activities in its immediate European neighbourhood as well as in faraway corners in Africa, the Middle-East and Asia. The EU’s contributions to SSR in these regions include transfer of knowledge, skills, resources and values through training of the police forces, border guards, and support for enhancing rule of law (Dursun-Ozkanca 2015, 353-354). In addition, in ongoing conflict situations, EU-SSR missions also target defence sector focused infrastructure development through training security actors (Ibid). In such missions, the traditional ‘train and equip’ approach has undermined the “reform and develop” approach of the OECD. A relatively new but fast spreading variant of ‘train and equip’ approach – train and equip security force assistance programmes\(^1\) focus on helping the state security sector to achieve monopoly of force. This is targeted by enhancing capacity for counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. These missions pay little attention to whether the public views the security forces as legitimate or whether those security forces understand how to protect civilians. It is also argued that such components of SSR programmes primarily provide training in weaponry, intelligence and enemy targeting and small efforts to improve protection of civilians and human rights. In non-democratic states, by following train and equip programs, that provide weapons and training to

\(^1\) Some countries refer to this as ‘foreign security assistance’ or ‘foreign military financing’
abusive security forces that lack public legitimacy is found to be overlooked (McNerney et al. 2014).

The chart below illustrates how the conflict assessment of the problem shapes the theory of change and intervention design, and whether it is a train and equip or governance-development approach.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict Assessment</th>
<th>Theory of Change and Intervention Design</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reform &amp; Develop</td>
<td>- Reform of security system to prioritize human security and contribute to a monopoly of legitimacy for the state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Training for security forces in protection of civilians, civilian oversight and public engagement in national security dialogues for improved security governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal: a monopoly of legitimacy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Train &amp; Equip</td>
<td>- Training and equipping state security forces to regain the monopoly of force in their fight against terrorist or insurgent groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal: a monopoly of force</td>
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Since the unveiling of the European Security Strategy of 2003, the EU also looks for ways to enhance the notion of 'comprehensive security', directly linking peace, development and political stability under which civilian and military capabilities, and resources and instruments are being brought closer together. The comprehensive approach also prioritises the development of "operations involving both military and civilian capabilities" (EU 2003, 82). At present, there are two concepts with regard to the interconnection between the civil and military approaches to crisis management. They are: Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), and Civil-Military Coordination (CMCO). The notion of Civil-Military Coordination (CMCO), which is part of the EU's Comprehensive Approach to crisis management, aims to address the need for effective coordination of the actions of all relevant EU actors involved in the planning and subsequent implementation of EU response to the crisis" (Council of the European Union 2003b). CMCO thus represents an attempt to create an EU-wide culture of coordination for EU hybrid crisis management missions (Gross 2008; Gebhard 2008, 89). Civil-Military Humanitarian Co-ordination is a specialized sub-set of CMCO and is defined as "the essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and when appropriate pursue common goals". Civil Military Co-operation (CIMIC) is a sub-set of CMCO and aims to coordinate civilians with the military to support the military missions. It also refers to co-operation at operational and tactical levels "with the specific aim of connecting and making use of military capabilities in theatre for the coordination of and co-operation with national, international and non-governmental civilian actors." Civil-
military synergies include a shared pool of resources, dual use of military personnel and equipment, administrative cooperation and coordination.\textsuperscript{2}

Within the EU, coordination, corporation and synergy was demanded in logistical support, communication and in the information systems, strategic and tactical transportation, security and protection, and also joint training schemes. The increase in the terminology not only shows the complex and evolving nature of SSR vocabulary, but also the challenges faced by security actors, who do not follow the same chain of command, yet are mixed together in a crisis area and have to work together under different lines of command that are informed by different levels of understanding, theories of change and approaches to the same problem.

Drawing from the above developments, it is correct to state, that over time, the EU has progressively and systematically devised key terms, definitions and concepts to guide its SSR policies and practices. Particularly, by citing its reform-development approach to SSR interventions, the EU has been able to justify its external interventions under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (Sabio 2010).

When looking at the development of the various terms, definitions and concepts on SSR, lingering conceptual ‘fuzziness’ surrounding SSR is evident. This seems to stand in the way of giving clear policy direction for undertaking SSR missions abroad. Given the various definitions of SSR, there is room for approaching, perceiving and assessing SSR as an idea, norm, and agenda or as a programme. Some approach IS from a development perspective (i.e. World Bank), security perspective (i.e. OSCE, NATO, and EU) or democratic perspective (i.e. Council of Europe), others based on geographical factors; globally (i.e. UN, EU, OSCE), regionally (i.e. African Union, Council of Europe) or sub-regionally (i.e. ECOWAS). Similarly SSR is understood along different functions; capacity building, technical assistance functions (i.e. Council of Europe), norm development or norm transfer functions (i.e. OECD) or both (i.e. EU, OSCE). These different perspectives are based on different assumptions, theories of change, and assessment criteria, which, in practice, always do not gel together. Regardless of the availability and application of numerous variations and approaches to SSR within and outside the EU, in the past decade, the dominant Euro-Atlantic framework of SSR has been applied and exported to a number of different contexts; post-conflict (i.e. EU, NATO, OSCE), transition countries (i.e. Council of Europe) or developing countries (i.e. OECD, ECOWAS, World Bank) (Dursun-Ozkanca and Vandemoortele 2012). Compared to the security assistance programmes undertaken during the Cold War period, currently the dominant Euro-Atlantic variant of SSR interventions hinges on liberal normative premise prioritises and promotes idea of governance, respect for universal human rights, sustainability and democratic civilian control of the armed forces. For this reason, some refer to SSR as the ‘linchpin’ of the liberal state building project.

\textsuperscript{2} According to the UN definition, civil-military coordination is “the system of interaction, involving exchange of information, negotiation, de-confliction, mutual support, and planning at all levels between military elements and humanitarian organisations, development organisations, or the local civilian population, to achieve respective objectives” (Muehlmann 2009, 393).
More critical scholars refer to SSR as a vehicle for moving a state’s armed forces – its practices, doctrines and management structures – towards Western norms of behaviour (Bellamy 2003, 106).

3. Genealogy of EU-SSR Policy Developments

The EU is not a newcomer to the global security arena. Over years, it has been instrumental in shaping the post-Cold War security architecture. In the recent past, the Treaty of Lisbon and the 2010–14 Stockholm Programme opened up new opportunities for the EU to play a more serious role as an international security actor (Monar 2010, 24).

The EU’s overall security policy – and its SSR specific policies are drawn from many sources beyond the EU (i.e. UN and the World Bank). In the recent past, the UN Secretary-General’s report (January 2008) entitled ‘Securing Peace and Development: the role of the United Nations in Supporting Security Sector Reform’ has been instructive for the EU’s policy developments (Ebo and Powell 2012, 45). Another UN report that focuses on UN’s partnerships, regional SSR efforts, and the first stand-alone Security Council (SC) resolution on SSR released April 2014 can be considered as other sources of influence and inspiration for the EU. Increased corporation sought between the EU and UN through the newly established European External Action Service (EEAS) in 2010, is worth mentioning too. Besides, the EU Plan of Action for CSDP Support to UN Peacekeeping (July 2012 until the end of 2014) and adoption of the UN guidelines on Co-ordination between the UN and the EU during planning of UN missions and EU civilian and military operations (April 2014), are other opportunities where the EU and the UN are striving for closer forms of co-operation and instances of influencing and borrowing from each other’s policies (Madsen and Pietz 2014, 1). Similar to the UN, the EU’s experiences in security matters and its SSR policy-making is being shaped by interacting with and taking part in security-related discussions with other international organisations, such as OECD, OCSE, NATO and the Council of Europe. Adopting the code of conduct of OSCE for democratic oversight of the security sector (in 1994), taking active participation and regular consultations with NATO under NATO’s Berlin Plus agreement and Member States’ continued involvement in OECD-DAC meetings, suffice evidences to this claim.

Further, the EU’s heavy engagement in the failed and collapsed state scenarios in the 1990s also pushed it to develop a new security policy framework for its future activities. Besides, the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) facilitated opportunities for the EU to become more involved in security matters in third countries. More recently, EU pre-accession assistance, democratisation and development cooperation, and the deployment of civilian and military missions, under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) highlights the birth of a more focused policy of SSR and its institutionalisation within the EU. At present, the EU’s various community instruments and policies, fall under themes of Development Co-operation, Enlargement, the Stabilisation and Association Process, the European Neighbourhood Policy, Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management, Democracy and Human Rights, and the external dimension of the area of Freedom, Security and Justice, all are being utilised to support SSR interventions in different parts of the world (Commission of the European Communities 2006,
3). Among the policy developments, the EC’s eagerness to distinguish the military means of peacebuilding from the civilian means of peacebuilding is noteworthy. By following norms and principles of democracy, accountability, transparency and good governance, the EC shows increased commitment towards ‘civilian’ measures. However by so doing, it has excluded developing policies to deal with military and non-statutory security actors. To make its policies take effect, the EC also extends the provisions of Official Development Assistance (ODA) to the area of security (agreed at the OECD/DAC High-Level Meeting in March 2005) and makes financial resources available to fund a wider spectrum of SSR activities. These activities include all the civilian aspects of SSR and activities related to democratic and civilian control of the military and financial and administrative management of defence issues (ibid, 7).

Feira Council (2000) signifies another milestone of SSR policy development. From the Feira Council onwards, the EU began to focus on four priority areas, namely; police capabilities, rule of law, civilian administration, and civil protection. To-date, they continue to provide guidance for undertaking SSR missions abroad and enhance the EU’s unfolding approach to development of civilian capabilities (Gourlay 2004, 413-414).

Using regional policies as articulated in numerous EU agreements, the EU has been developing more targeted policy frameworks to undertake SSR related activities in a third country. The Cotonou agreement (2000) that established a 20 year-long partnership with the Asia Caribbean and Pacific group (ACP) is one important example in this regard. By using this agreement, the EU was able to impose a number of conditions on the ACP countries and to obtain their compliance and co-operation for SSR activities in the region. In a similar fashion, European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is put for instrumental use in the EU’s Southern Mediterranean neighbourhood. However, in this region, progress made in achieving SSR goals are limited (European Commission 2015). The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) initially unveiled in 2004. It signified a major milestone of the development of SSR and used SSR as a key foreign policy instrument. Next, experiences gained from the ENP were applied for the development of the EU Africa strategy for Africa (Dec. 2005). African strategy included SSR as a tool of post-conflict reconstruction. Further, it identified seven policy areas where SSR-related tasks will be undertaken; they are: development co-operation, EU enlargement, European Neighbourhood policy, conflict prevention and crisis management, democracy and human rights and Freedom, Security and Justice. Given the main content of the ENP and the modalities devised for its implementation, some refer to the ENP as a model for the “export” of key elements of the EU’s internal security governance thinking and structures. The objectives, legislative and organisational approaches of the EU are well reflected in the ENP framework. Similarly, Monar (2010, 26) argues the eastward and south-eastward expansion of the Area of

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3 The purpose of this cooperation is to strengthen regional integration in the southern Mediterranean. It is essential to have this closer cooperation alongside the EU’s bilateral relations with the countries in the region, developed through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) (European Commissions (2015) Joint Staff Working Document: Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean Partners Report, Brussels
Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ -2004 and 2007) as an attempt of externalisation of AFSJ using internal security rationale under the ENP label.

Drawing from major milestones in the journey of EU-SSR policy developments, contrary to the initially somewhat inexplicit and organically evolved set of SSR policies and activities in the late 90's, in 2003, the First European Security Strategy (ESS) declared by European High Representative Javier Solana titled 'A Secure Europe in a Better World', explicitly provided guidance for shaping a new generation of SSR thinking, policies and activities. His declaration paved the way for analysing the security environment much sharper and identified key security challenges and their political implications for the EU. The original strategy that was again revised in 2008 was a clear indication of the EU's ambitions of becoming a serious global player in the arena of security and its intentions of using SSR as a key tool to facilitate the EU's external actions. The document clearly underlined how and why SSR should be “part of a broader institution building” process (Council of the European Union 2003, 5; Dursun-Ozkanca and Vandemoortele 2012, 139). However along the way, as one critic has observed, “the European Security Strategy came to be quickly turned into a policy on fragile states. The linkage of the EU’s policy on fragile states to security concerns has led to an emphasis on a wide set of policy instruments that make an explicit connection between development, humanitarian, military and security aspects—sometimes referred to as a ‘whole-of-EU approach’, within which the governance dimension came to be emphasised” (Hout 2010, 142). Along the same lines of criticism, Sabiote notes the EU’s increased use of the SSR discourse in the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and for justifying its external interventions, by wrapping these in the security-good governance-development paradigm (Sabiote 2010).

Although there was no direct reference made to SSR, ‘European Consensus on Development’ (ECD) (2005), is a major step for furthering SSR policy development. It provided fertile ground for future EU-SSR policies to flourish and operate more coherently. By making the security and development nexus more explicit, ECD paved the way for undertaking coherent and coordinated SSR related tasks. As per ECD, coherence seeks to take account of development objectives in all its policies that are likely to affect developing countries and minimising contradictions, building synergies between different EU policies to benefit developing countries and increase the effectiveness of development cooperation” (European Commission 2015). As follow up to the ECD, in 2005, a legislative framework was introduced to facilitate financing SSR activities (from 2007-2013). This framework enabled bringing numerous SSR tasks previously scattered between various EU departments. Gathering momentum from the legislative framework, in June 2006, the EU launched its first overarching SSR framework. The new framework provided recommendations to strengthen EC’s contribution to SSR interventions. In addition, it also laid down a list of key ‘must have’ competencies for the EU to undertake overseas SSR missions. Strengthening policy and programming dialogue; integrating SSR into both Country Strategy Papers (CSP) and their Regional equivalents (RSP); action plans and programming tools; ensuring coordinated planning; strengthening overall implementation of EU support; developing tools for planning and implementation; developing SSR-specific training for the mainstreaming of SSR; prioritising SSR under the new Financial Instruments; and, strengthening cooperation with international partners, are some of them (Commission of the European Communities 2006, 10-12).
In 2005 and 2006, the Commission and the Council adopted two separate concepts of security that are relevant for the further development of EU-SSR policies and practices. They focus on institutional competences required for the Commission and the Council for undertaking security related interventions. For example, for the Commission, enhancing competencies in Rule of Law (RoL) was emphasised. 2007 marked another milestone for EU policy development, namely, the European Commission’s Instrument for Pre-Accession. This instrument provided assistance for candidates for EU membership by assisting them with the following: political reform, institution building, strengthening the rule of law, human rights, protection of minorities, and the development of civil society in countries that have started the EU accession process. All these programmes deal directly and indirectly with SSR in pre-accession countries.

The Lisbon Treaty (December 2009) is another major cornerstone in the development of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The Lisbon treaty laid the foundation for establishing the EU’s newest institution: the European External Action Service (EEAS). It came under the authority of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs & Security Policy and a Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP). Bringing all the necessary EU assets together and applying the EU’s “Comprehensive Approach” to crisis management are the main functions assigned to the EEAS and the two new offices created under it (EEAS 2012). EEAS ought to address long-standing issues of the EU’s overlapping and incoherent external actions and to lift the EU’s reputation and credibility as a serious international actor. Addressing incoherencies of the two main policies – Development and Security – was made a priority. In 2010, the above developments were further sharpened with the adoption of Council’s internal concept and European Commission’s contribution to CSDP Justice Missions (Madsen and Pietz 2014, 2).

Among others, the Council’s commitment expressed (2015) towards full implementation of the Civilian Capability Development Plan (CCDP) comes across as an interesting recent development related to EU-SSR policy and practice. Presently the CCDP invited the High Representative and the Commission – in consultation with the Member States – to develop an EU-wide strategic framework for Security Sector Reform by mid-2016. In parallel to the emphasis paid to the need for further development of civilian measures and the capabilities and capacities of CSDP, ‘Council Conclusions on CSDP’ released on 18 May 2015 also underlined the need of strengthening the links between the EU’s external and internal security policy. This was a step in the direction of increasing synergies in the EU’s responses to a list of priority horizontal issues, namely; terrorism, organised crime, foreign fighters, smuggling and trafficking in human beings, irregular migration, hybrid threats, border management, energy security and cyber security. Synergies between internal and external dimension of responses continued to be sought in the ongoing process related to European Security Agenda for Security’ (2015, 3). Judging by the progress around this process, likelier domination of international security and the subject of defence in the EU’s future security strategy, hence SSR is highly anticipated.

Undoubtedly, ‘security’ is the single most important theme of EU affairs, internally and externally. Fluri and Spence concurred "Security policy is one of the most promising policy instruments of EU" (2008). In Monar’s words, "in the ten years since the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ (AFSJ) has been the EU’s fastest expanding policymaking domain with over 1200 texts adopted by the JHA Council and a more than twentyfold increase in EU budgetary expenditure” (2010, 23). Hence, under which,
SSR is increasingly gaining importance as one of the most important tools of Union’s external actions. Others have observed, EU-SSR policy development as a process of “epistemic learning” and “learning by doing” (Faleg 2012, 147-48) and they emphasise the need for more ‘learning’. Therefore, soon unveiling EU’s New European Security Strategy 2016-2020 will tell us how and to what extent the EU has learned and unlearned.
4. Knowledge Production: A snapshot of two decades of EU-SSR research, with a reflection on key methodological contours

In the late 1990s, the term SSR was first mentioned in Eastern Europe. Since then, SSR has become an important line of academic inquiry of researchers belonging to different theoretical and epistemological schools. Initially, SSR was a topic dominated by political scientists and by its counterparts in the sub fields of International Relations and Security Studies. Therefore, the first generation of SSR researchers were handicapped by certain epistemological stands and methodological boundaries set in these study areas. Generating structural explanations, privileging a state centric approach to the study of security, and institutional, international and transnational relations oriented explanations are a few such handicaps identified. One of the major positive contributions of the first generation of SSR researchers is the identification of what Chanaa coined "conceptual-contextual divide" (2006, 13). Bringing attention to this specific divide has helped identify the gaps and challenges in operationalising the SSR concept and the need for continued adaptation of it to local contexts.

Among the first generation of SSR scholarly work, the vast majority of studies focused on single cases. Often, they superficially explored the dynamics of security governance over long periods, at the macro-national level. By so doing, these studies have overlooked the related micro level political aspects of SSR, thus becoming an ally of donors' technocratic approaches to SSR. Turning a blind eye to micro level security governance arrangements, also ignored the non-statutory actors in security. Applying on case study method allowed researchers to focus their analyses on the implementation of existing policies, and find ways to improve external strategies within the existing approach. As a result, after more than a decade of convergence of concept and policy, relatively little is understood about how SSR is actually implemented, the implications for practice, and what effect they have for local-level security governance arrangements.

According to the conclusion of a methodological map drawn on the first generation of SSR studies, Jackson notes, the bulk of the research ended up being decoupled from the debates about state-building and liberal peacebuilding. Further, he adds to the fact that, by being uncritical of the 'big picture' within which SSR policies and practices are developed and executed, previous researches have become an indirect ally to the promotion of the liberal peace narrative, exporting ideas of the western liberal state model and the Weberian bureaucratic state ethos to totally different contexts through SSR programming (2011). Other scholars, Schroeder & Chappuis claim, as the early generation of researchers also failed to capture the intractable disconnects between external reform efforts and domestic orders of security governance (2012, 135-136). Further following up on this line of critique, they claim, the bulk of SSR related research in the past has been faulted by its biased focus on external interests that neglect the agency and power of domestic actors. In their words, "asymmetric power relations, measured both in terms of political and material resources, expose external actors to accusations of neo-colonialism, imperialism, paternalism and self-interested imposition" (2012, 136).
Given the ‘top down’ and state centric nature of the first generation of SSR research, the new generation of SSR scholars was aspired to apply a more ‘bottom up’, society centric, non-institutionalist approach and sub-national level approaches. By using micro-context focused empirical data, these scholars have attempted to develop an understanding of the exigencies of context and offer general insights into the nature of security governance and reform at the local, inter-personal level of interaction. As an off-shoot for this pursuance, going beyond the traditional methodological ‘tools’ available through political science was essential. To better grasp and enhance understanding as to how the adaptations of the SSR concept in real contexts occur, these researchers were compelled to borrow beyond political science (Schroeder and Chappuis 2014, 141).

Further, more recent reviews of the academic literature on SSR also indicate that, despite the level of scholarly attention given to SSR, the overall body of SSR literature is staying thin on theory and having to operationalise within a limited conceptual terrain (ibid). On the latter, the following developments in the academic discourses on SSR are observed. Amongst these, striving to expand the conceptual terrain available for assessing SSR, is notable. The attempts for expanding the conceptual terrain available for SSR is particularly seen in the debates on state fragility and limited statehood. By applying these new concepts, namely, ‘hybrid security governance’ in/and ‘limited statehood scenarios’, Schroeder, Chappuis and Kocak were able to advance SSR research by identifying patterns of adoption, adaptation or rejection of international security governance standards by domestic actors. Application of new concepts allowed to partially respond to the conceptual-contextual divide cited by the first generation of scholars. Currency of their findings complemented the empirical observations made in diverse contexts; from Timor Leste, Liberia and the Palestinian Territories. Applying the concept of hybridity and limited statehood to Afghanistan, Koehler and Gosztonyi have arrived at similar conclusions as Schroeder & Chappuis (2014, 141).

In addition, along the conceptual axis, researchers have begun to question the uncritical acceptance and application of seemingly neutral and uncontested terms such as ‘sector’ in SSR studies and policies. Such questions are prominent in the debates of limited statehood and hybrid governance. According to some critical researchers, believing in one unified sector of organised institutional forms (an attribute often assigned to developed western liberal states), is not applicable to the majority of places where SSR is implemented. Thus the use of conceptual terms such as ‘sector’ is found unhelpful and even as an impediment to knowledge production. Given these limitations, largely owing to the field of governance, suggestions are made for conceptualizing the security sector as a ‘political field’ (treating it as constituting diverse actors that compete for influence) and resources and a ‘shifting terrain’ of security coalitions (Hills 2014, 166).

The newest generation of SSR researchers belong to various subject areas, spanning from Governance Studies to Public Finance Management. Their findings are informed by a diverse strand of theoretical perspectives i.e., resource dependency theory, sociological organisational theories, policy transfer research and post-colonial approaches to the study of governance. Compared to the first generation of SSR research, the second generation of contributions offers a fairly comprehensive and analytically sharper understanding. For example, by applying the resource-dependency theory (with a perspective on governance), researchers have attempted to bring the multitude of public and private actors involved in SSR...
into a much sharper focus, than ever before (Justaert 2012, 219). In contrast to the conventional state-centric studies which put the formal and institutions structures and actors into the centre-stage of analysis, scholars from the resource dependency theory were able to cast light on the non-formal, non-statutory and dimension of SSR processes. In a similar fashion, contrary to the perceived idea of a unified state sector and security sector, scholars who apply sociological organisation theories are better able to trace different types of ‘hybrid security orders’ and ‘frictioned’ security governance arrangements. These studies drew attention to the scenario of colliding of top-down international and bottom-up domestic approaches to security governance in SSR processes (Schroeder et al. 2014, 214). Raising awareness of several patterns of SSR realisation identified along selective adoption of SSR components by local actors is noted as one of the major contributions of the sociologically inspired studies on SSR. These studies beg further inquiry into the origins and evolution of numerous SSR realisation patterns. Moreover, by drawing attention to the empirical category coined as ‘ceremonial SSR structures’ in local contexts, sociological research on SSR draws attention to the normative questions and the normative underpinning of SSR policies and practices.

Scholars studying security governance, situating their work in post-colonial perspectives, mainly focus on questions on (local) agency and relational aspects (hegemonic, domination, subordination and resistance). By posing questions illuminating the above aspects, post-colonial perspectives of SSR draw attention to processes of translation, appropriation and resistance that shape SSR outcomes through numerous ways of interactions and encounters (Schroeder & Chappuis 2014, 143). Quite importantly, they are able to offer insights into localised instances of security governance that they identified as realising ‘new forms of modernity’. By interpreting diverse range of SSR outcomes as new forms of modernity, post-colonial inspired SSR research claim to provide important insights on what is non-official, the informal and the un-institutionalized forms of influence and interactions.

Contributions from ‘transfer research’ are noted as the newest developments related to SSR research. Transfer research attempts to bring new theoretical perspectives to the study of state-building and thereby hopes to bring new insights into how the practice(s) of international interventions can be studied (Schroeder et al. 2013, 386). It offers a promising ground for assessing substantive and procedural changes in international actors’ interventions in the arena of security governance of fragile or post-conflict states. By comparing different transfer processes in diverse contexts where SSR missions and activities have taken place (i.e. Liberia, Timor-Leste and the Palestinian Territories), researchers claim, despite the numerous variations

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On the question of as to why it is important for capturing and understanding ceremonial SSR structures, Schroeder writes, “these ceremonial SSR structures effectively shield an organisation from the effects of externally induced processes of change, these instances of ‘loose coupling’ between an organisation’s formal structure and its actual day-to-day activities allows an organisation to formally adhere to the specific normative requirements of its institutional environment, yet without necessarily changing its routines and practice” (2014, 217).
identified across political, economic and strategic factors in each domestic context, external SSR interventions produce distinct similarities. As Schröder et al. claim, the findings based on transfer research tradition on SSR shows an encouraging sign of future theory development and potential avenues for generalising SSR research (Schröder et al. 2013, 381). While battling to sustain a revisionist and post-liberal approach to SSR studies and practice (i.e. by introducing concepts of local ownership, human security, in particular), transfer researchers are keen to expose the deeper normative underpinning of SSR as an agenda and its highly interventionist character (ibid 382). Moreover, transfer researchers also claim their contributions are being helpful in uncovering mechanisms and processes that drive the international transmission of security norms, institutions and practices. By focusing on the procedural aspects of peacebuilding and state-building in general, and SSR in particular, transfer research hopes to dig deeper on the questions of ‘how international donors are turning SSR policy into practice’ as well as to what extent the donor commitments reflect substantive new approaches or merely ‘business as usual’. By going beyond the ‘supply-side’ analyses of interventions that focus exclusively on the nature of external support, transfer researchers hope to analyse relationships between senders and receivers of external assistance and illuminate how the relationship between the senders and receivers develops and changes over time (Schröder et al 2013, 384). Given the strengths of this approach and the criticisms often heard of the intentional security actors, the potential contribution from transfer research for the future studies of EU-SSR interventions seems significant.

In the current body of literature on SSR, application of the political-economy (PE) approach is proven useful. Although, instances of applying a PE approach to SSR research is few, the analytical rigour it offers appears relevant. Particularly, PE approach’s strength for digging for in-depth understanding of local SSR operational contexts and assessing how and why certain reform processes have failed, is worth the attention of future research. Since the majority of SSR missions are deployed in what Egnell and Halden have called “society-less contexts” (Lien undated, 4) – i.e. places where there is a situation of limited statehood or hybrid governance – PE analysis can advance an understanding of the particularities in each of these SSR contexts. Further, PE can help challenge basic assumptions underpinning SSR policies, such as; the importance of state-centric notion of security, all actors (society, economic actors and politicians) wanting a strong state structure similar to that in the West, and the existence of a state-society relationship, are few to name here. As PE researchers observe, in (m)any post-conflict setting(s), low state capacity is seen as a desired outcome in “society-less contexts”. This contrasts with the assumption held by external security actors. Further, PE researchers warns of the assumption of made on omnipresent existence of a political community or political elite groups demanding a state. Further, ruling out certain contexts of spaces as ungoverned is challenged. To the latter effect, they explain how the political and security vacuum emerges after violent conflicts in fact represent different governing arrangements, often dominated by actors of predatory characters; warlords, criminal networks and corrupt political elites. Further, PE studies are able to point to the tendency of re-emergence of traditional security governance structures in post conflict contexts that runs counter to the aspirations of neat state centric assumptions guiding SSR programming. As PE analysis reminds, state is only one among several competing organisations governing society. According to Lien, when designing security sector reforms, it is very important to be aware of these numerous dispersed structures, their relationship with each other and with the state. Overall, one could say that, PE research on SSR
pushes towards a more productive, comprehensive understanding of the political economy of a country. Citing evidences from Afghanistan for simultaneous presence of several different layers of power in local economic structures and from Bosnia and Herzegovina, for narrow interest of warlords, other violent entrepreneurs such as the criminalised political elite – who have little interest in strengthening the administrative capacity of the security sector – PE research draws attention to a range of factors standing in the way of realising SSR. In sum, Lien states "the very norms of SSR challenge the leadership and power structures that they and the current governments rest upon" (Lien undated, 13). Overall, beyond SSR studies, PE researchers hope that thinking, policy and practice of security can be made less technocratic and more political, to include larger problems such as state capture, ethnic relations, human rights violations, social exclusion and extreme inequalities (Hout 2010, 141). Further, PE research also usefully reminds of the myth "one size fits all" in state-building, and dangers of designing SSR activities without taking the premises of local economic structures into account. Given some of the main strengths, this study finds, PE analysis have real possibilities for overcoming the current scenario of short term "regime security" (ibid) and establish a long term "human security" situation through SSR programming.

Analysis of the decades of development of scholarly discourses and their contribution to SSR thinking, policy and practices, suggest the need for embracing 'politics matter' more seriously. This is supported by one main conclusion of SSR researchers working in diverse disciplinary and theoretical traditions that tend to agree that sharply defined models, technical definitions and normative goals associated with Western-style security governance and reform projects are analytically and empirically misleading, when they are applied to areas of limited statehood (Hills 2014, 177). Further, as Darzun-Ozkanca and Vandemoortele find, the current phase of SSR research is heavily based on policy studies and policy analyses. One of the drawbacks of research based on SSR policy studies is the limited focus set on description of cases, and tendency for overlooking critical factors that explain the processes and outcomes of SSR (Dursun-Ozkanca and Vandemoortele 2012, 146). Given these observations, for SSR scholars, what remains to be done is developing a sharper political analytical framework backed by a strong political theory of change. So far, in this direction, the works of Hudson and Leftwich (2014, 102) seem to offer a promising ground. Hudson and Leftwich's work beg for building analytical approaches to capture both the inner and outer works of politics, placing power at the heart of analysis and developing an approach that further disaggregates structure, agency, power, ideas and contingency. Given the theory-light nature and meagre and scattered picture of analytical robustness of previous SSR research, the variant of political analysis proposed by Hudson and Leftwich (ibid) could open up new and robust lines of inquiry for future SSR research (especially EU-SSR research). Eventually, this could contribute to the much needed theory development on SSR.
5. Insights from the Field: Main Gaps and Challenges

Empirical evidences gathered from EU-SSR operational missions suggest a notable gap between the governance-development approach and technical train and equip approach of EU-SSR interventions. They also show as to how technical train and equip approach could result in unintended negative effects and undermining effects over the governance-development approach. To this effect, EU-SSR missions in Somalia and Mali offer striking examples. Use of EUTM trainees to combat local insurgencies soon after the EUTM mission left raises doubts over the EU’s commitment to long term governance-development approach. As these two cases demonstrate, the EU’s train and equip missions and defence capacity building measures under short term EUTMs do not necessarily generate the intended changes, namely; leading up to the development of legitimate, sustainable, and a defence sector civilian control. Rather, in the medium term, training missions contribute to negative side effects (Dursun-Ozkanca 2015, 353-354 353) and continue to feed the policy and practice divide (Skeppström, Wiklum and Jonnson 2015).

Researchers have also identified a widening gap between the EU’s actual practices based on a state centric notion of security and its rhetorical commitment extended to Human Security, the latter as reflected in the Lisbon Treaty Article 21.1. EU-SSR operational missions suggest a tendency towards prioritising traditional state security. This development was especially noted after the September 11th attacks. As Sedra points out, the promise of human security in security governance was severely undercut as the end goal of international interventions; nothing but establishing a liberal statehood and protecting it from any form of threat and risk (Sedra 2010, 19). This blueprint of the liberal state model falls short in representing the needs of the individuals. Compared to the Human Security approach, the liberal state model is accused of not offering enough capacity to resolve even the fundamental existential dilemmas of people. In this regard, the security sector related intervention made in Iraq (since 2003), and the early case of SSR intervention in Bosnia (i.e. police force reforms) provide two striking examples. In all these missions, by prioritising a state centric notion of security and state monopoly of violence, liberal statehood and liberal peacebuilding were attempted. Thus, paradoxically, sometimes even putting individuals’ security at risk and serving the interests of powerful national elites. As the SSR missions undertaken by the EU and other western donors in Afghanistan show, establishing new hierarchies, or validating and legitimising the older hierarchies of oppression and insecurity runs counter to the human security concerns of the civilian population. Examples from SSR interventions in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) demonstrate, how these interventions contribute to perpetuation of authoritarian retrenchment. As Mustafa claims, in the case of the OPT, “the international SSR interventions created a socio-political paradox on the ground that diverges substantially from conventional understandings of security and statehood, producing a conflicted authoritarian system of governance in the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority and entrenching rather than challenging or tempering the paradigm of Israeli occupation” (Mustafa 2015, 212).

Taken together, the above examples also illustrate as to how, when externally lead SSR interventions that hinge on the liberal state model, where state security and state’s monopoly of violence is prioritised, end up creating a new situation where the national political and
military elites are made accountable to the external donors, instead of to the local constituencies. Evidence from Afghanistan point to how the local elites were held accountable to the EU. Similarly, the police reforms undertaken by the EU in Bosnia also revealed how the underlying liberal state model and top-down reforms targeting elite security needs undermined realising an inclusive, sustainable and legitimate SSR processes. In Bosnia, the incentives the EU put on the table (i.e. EU accession) to buy support for the police reforms have even faced a backlash from the Bosnian people. Bosnians viewed the entire reform exercise as an effort for fostering ‘elite peace’ and ‘top-down’ reforms. Moreover, the EU’s approach to SSR in Bosnia contributed to the weakening of the Bosnian state ‘by increasing the domestic legitimacy of anti-state forces’ (Juncos 2014, 57). In Bosnia, SSR did not factor in a discerned lack of inter-ethnic trust. Instead, the EU’s technical-top-down SSR reforms simply ignored the context specific ethno-political-economy factors, thus resulting in intense competition between different ethnic groups for securing state power and access to state resources by establishing zones of influence in the arena of security governance and control over the police. Eventually, these developments have eroded local people’s trust in the state institutions. The EU-SSR case in Bosnia, on one hand, signifies SSR intervention reproducing the old institutions that fall short in legitimacy from the local people and on the other hand, legitimising of these institutions by external actors.

Coordination is deemed important for EU hybrid crisis management missions (Gross 2008; Gebhard 2008 in Hynekab 2011, 89). With the establishment of the European External Action Services (EEAS) by the Lisbon Treaty (2009), the EU hopes for effective and efficient coordination between civil and military missions and to improve strategic coordination between the two main structures (Council and the Commission) responsible for them (Hynekab 2011: 84). Despite these notable efforts, researchers show the EU continuing to struggle to overcome the coordination issues within the EU. Most of these coordination issues are blamed on the EU’s organisational culture (as opposed to the usual suspect of the EU’s institutional separation). There are evidences that claim how the coordination issues are affecting EU’s SSR missions. The EU’s two SSR related missions to Bosnia (EUPM and EUFOR), that were launched to combat organised crime, are illustrative of the lack of coordination between the civil-military missions. These two missions illuminate how the EU adopted very different approaches to the same problem, and how these two missions were planned and executed in a mutually-exclusive way. For instance, EUPM’s mandate was non-executive, therefore came to be undermined by the EUFOR mission that was an executive mandate stemmed directly from the Dayton Agreement. The two different approaches led to an uneasy relationship which made the coordination between the two components of civil-military rather difficult. Further, EUPM followed a long term sustainable capacity building approach totally devoted to local ownership and trusting the local police. Whereas, EUFOR was eager for making quick results; therefore put pressure on organised crime networks while circumventing local authorities whom they perceived as corrupt (Muehlman 2008, 287).

Reflecting of the previous examples where SSR missions (particularly civilian and military missions) were hampered by EU coordination level issues, many welcome the establishment of the EEAS. However, some scholars still warn of the possibility of realising an informal “culture of coordination” that could result in similar negative results as discussed above (Norheim-Martinsen and Martin 2010, 1). Besides, doubts are also being raised as to how and what plans the new EEAS will develop to avoid the influences of more resourceful and militarily powerful
EU members (Germany, France and UK) in the Council’s decision making processes, to ease the complexities involved in the chain of command in SSR missions and avoid the dominating effects of the military over the civilian aspect of EU missions (Hynekab 2011, 83).

Building genuine local ownership to SSR interventions is identified as another major challenge faced by international donors, let alone by EU-SSR operational missions. In principle, commitment to ‘local ownership’ stands as a cornerstone of SSR donor policy. Every major donor statement on SSR thus contains some kind of incitement for external actors to consult a broad range of actors as stakeholders in security provision, to adapt to local context and to seek ‘local’ or ‘national’ ‘buy-in’ or ‘ownership’ (Schroeder and Chappius 2014, 137). When operationalising these, the EU is faced with a number of key dilemmas. First of all, it is faced with somewhat basic yet important questions such as: which state or institutions to build; which and whose capacities to reinforce; should the development of non-state security practices be encouraged; and, whether or not these practices can truly contribute to upholding the principle of local ownership; and what to do when the genuine local ownership is fostered at the expense of reinforcing central state’s apparatus, states monopoly of violence and contradicts the blueprint liberal state model (Mitchell 2011; Richmond 2010 in Dursun-Ozkanca & Vandemoortele 2012, 152).

More critical research identifies the challenge of realising local ownership in SSR stemming from some of the basic assumptions of the underlying principle. This principle allows donors to make assumptions on local ownership and allow them to act with some degree of certainty about who is local, what ownership means or looks like, and how to get more of it. Given this, local ownership in SSR discourse and practice masks a deeper ambivalence about whose interests and agency should be central to the analysis. Further, by trying taking a top down approach that inevitably place external interventions at the centre of the analysis, SSR interventions marginalise what is ‘local’ as understood by the locals themselves. Once the analysis is done from the point of view of the external actors, local actors get treated as supporting cast in alternating roles as partners, heroes, victims or spoilers (Schroeder and Chappius 2014, 136).

There is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to local ownership. Therefore, in different SSR operational contexts, donors will have to dictate different strategies, based on the needs, level of corporation, the willingness, the capacity and the legitimacy of local institutions (Oosterveld and Galand 2012, 205). Not paying attention to these has resulted in cases of failed SSR reforms. For instance, in Afghanistan, the lack of local ownership for JSSR reforms was starkly evident in the different yet parallel processes that led up to the drafting of Afghanistan’s new law of criminal procedures. First and foremost, the new draft of criminal procedure was considered a brainchild of Italy. When drafting the procedures, Italy consulted no local groups, but solely relied on the international donors. As a result, the new criminal law procedures showed no regard or respect to the previously locally drafted procedures, thus exposing a plethora of unresolved tensions between international and local norms. A similar situation was reported from Timor-Leste as well. There, when drafting the procedures for judicial reforms, no consultations with the local communities had taken place. Thus, local communities completely ignored the UN revamped courts system now run by the Indonesians, because the local communities had no trust in the system and of the people appointed by the internationals. Hence, they continue to rely on traditional justice mechanisms (ibid).
The two examples from Afghanistan and Indonesia are illustrative of the continued tensions between international norms and local norms – that continue to neglect the involvement of local actors, sometimes even manipulating them in J/SSR undertakings. According to Caprini, local groups have much to contribute in conceiving a meaningful SSR in their local settings (2002). However, romanticizing local agency and local ownership to the point of abstraction, whereby non-state and local actors are imbued with a legitimacy that they do not possess among local constituencies, or overwriting their interests with ill-fitting notions of liberal civic motivation derived from Western political experience and contexts is warned against of (Schroeder and Chappius 2014, 137). To these critics, local ownership in internationally driven SSR is difficult, because, its main point of departure rests on unequal power relationship between external and internal actors. In this relationship, the external actors undertake the task of reforming the local society and treat the local as 'subjects' to be transformed.

Operationalising the principle of gender (equality, sensitivity, mainstreaming) is another key challenge identified. Overall, EU-SSR interventions struggle to make an impact and positive impression on its commitment to gender equality. Partly, this is due to the locals’ perception of gender equality as a western imposition and a western norm. As Kunz noted, in operational terrains, much to the dissatisfaction and to the surprise of many scholars, in the gendered SSR (GSSR) discourse, gender is still a marginalised issue – often mistaken as ‘adding women’ – thus continue to receive inadequate attention in SSR planning and implementation. Also, one of the assumptions in GSSR thinking and policies; that all men/women want to, and should be, part of GSSR, is found to be problematic. Scant attention paid to wider local political-economic factors and the often technical nature of GSSR executions are identified as challenges for realizing the EU’s commitment to gender equality in GSSR missions. Besides, there is a marked silence observed on the women who refuse to be part of GSSR discourse. As Kunz points out, by using women and adding them as ‘soft’ security providers in the GSSR discourse does not fundamentally destabilise the masculine connotation of the security sector and the hierarchy between the "real" security institutions and women's "different" security provisions (2012, 610). Further, empirical evidences from SSR operational missions show the inclusion of gender to the pre-existing technical models of SSR as a major impediment for realising gender inequality in these missions. Given the deeply political nature of gender issues, particularly in conflict ridden contexts that are marked by deeply entrenched gender hierarchies, an 'add-on-gender' component to the existing technically designed SSR interventions brush off deep-seated political aspects of the gender relations, unequal relations of power; therefore, inhibiting possibilities of transforming gender relations by maximising the opportunities present in post-conflict environments.

Particularly in post-conflict contexts, there is a significant demand for more resources for how to 'do' gender well in SSR. SSR is perceived as a key moment of transformation and a "window of opportunity" for integrating gender concerns (Kunz 2012, 2). To avoid the separation of gender from other matters in SSR, calls are made for gender to be treated within the broader SSR context. To avoid gender getting infused into the template models for SSR, calls are made for expansion of the current focus from representation and retention of women in SSR under the broad banner of gender balancing to gender mainstreaming and context sensitivity (Mobekk 2010, 278). Also, importance of avoiding instrumentalisation of GSSR under the liberal peace project that seeks to "enforce its norms" is emphasised (Hudson of cit., Kunz
Because, there is a real danger of the instrumental use of gender mainstreaming to diffuse Western liberal norms through creating widespread acceptance for, and legitimising of, these norms especially through peacekeeping and SSR interventions (Kunz 2012, 605-606).

Despite the many dilemmas as gathered from SSR operational contexts, there is still a great deal of trust put on gender mainstreaming. Field research highlights the transformative potential of external SSR interventions to influence local social institutions and structures. However, the transformative project of gender mainstreaming requires a long period of engagement in the field (Mobekk 2010, 279-280), a mission impossible to undertake by the current short term technically oriented SSR interventions. The EU and other external actors serving as positive role models for gender equality are necessary. As noted, "external actors serving as role models is often an important part of gender sensitisation and learning. However, the extent of positive role-modelling in gender sensitivity is subject to a combination of extreme macho culture exhibited by some of the police, military and paramilitary units deployed in post-conflict countries and the limited numbers of women deployed in peacebuilding operations" (Mobekk 2010, 284). As demonstrated in the DRC, attempting to include more women into the security forces, as demanded by GSSR advocates, resulted in quite different results than planned. Including more women in the armed forces changed the image of women. Hence, female soldiers were perceived as becoming "masculinised through entering the armed forces". The main lesson learnt here is, simple inclusion of women in the armed forces in order to render men less violent may not having the intended pacifying effect (Kunz 2012, 612). As the case of GSSR in DRC illuminates, it is important to pay attention to the possible pitfalls of gender mainstreaming and gender balancing in SSR.

The arena of security governance is represented by a number of diverse actors. It usually comprises many actors, including international organisations, individual nation-states, non-state security actors, private actors (i.e. consultancy firms and private security contractors), regional organisations, societies, recipients and donors. These actors often have competing agendas, interests and approaches, as to how to govern security and concomitantly how to design and execute SSR field missions. Among the major players, UN, the Council of Europe, the EU, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and NATO, have developed their own frameworks for co-operation with each other on security matters (Monar 2010, 36). It is often noted that, within Europe alone, there are a number of distinct 'European approaches' to SSR and security governance, which makes multi-stakeholder coordination, co-operation and coherence challenging area of practice.

On EU related SSR studies, researchers have identified incoherence and a lack of coordination as major barriers in realising SSR goals. To this effect, what researchers call horizontal, vertical and institutional incoherencies are significant (Lurweg 2011, 104). Horizontal incoherencies are a result of adopting different policy objectives. At the EU level, horizontal incoherence is particularly identified between the Commission-led SSR missions (under the CSDP flagship) and Council-led SSR missions. As Gourlay identified, although the EU has developed a range of instruments and strategies, their decision-making processes continue to be divided between the Commission and the Council. For instance, the EU’s military operations conducted by the Council and civil assistance missions executed through the Commission are divorced from each other (2004, 404). This scenario has resulted in the EU’s
overall approach to crisis management being a self-limiting one (ibid). The EU’s SSR missions in the DRC, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Somalia and Mali (EUTM, MINUSMA) provide striking examples where horizontal incoherencies (due to a lack of coordination and coherence between approaches various EU departments) were at fine display. To this effect, the SSR mission in Sudan shines as a rare example of multi-stakeholder coherence and coordination.

To illustrate further, in DRC, the EU undertook two civil missions under the flagship of CSDP. First, the EU advisory and assistance mission for security sector reform in the DRC (EUSEC RD Congo), second the EU police mission, EUPOL RD Congo – operating in the DRC to support the reform of the Congolese security sector. From the planning stage, these two missions were separated and responded to different lines of command. They also reported back to different institutions: the EU and the EUSEC RD Congo mission operated under the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), while the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) was in charge of operational planning and the conduct of civilian CSDP missions (Lurweg 2011, 105). In the case of Congo, these horizontal incoherencies within the EU affected setting meaningful timeframes for SSR missions, effective and meaningful resource distributions between various EU departments, and overlapping and complicating the effective use of range of peacebuilding instruments available to the EU in external engagements. Incoherencies were also traced in the systems of resource allocation and resource availability through different types of funding. Funding instruments, namely, the Development Fund (EDF), the Instrument for Stability (IFS) and the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) (Krause 2003; Klein 2010 in Justaert 2012, 221) that are scattered under different departments have affected the DRC-SSR missions negatively.

Overcoming vertical incoherencies is a key challenge for the EU. Most of the time, the national interests of individual EU member states are found to be undermining the EU’s holistic approach. Examples to this effect are identified since the 1990s. During the Yugoslav crisis, hopeless divisions among the European states as to what policy to follow, (Winn 2003, 51) marked the beginning of deepening and widening of vertical incoherencies. Recent empirical evidences gathered from EU-SSR missions, notes instances of national interests of certain Member States even preventing some states acting under the EU flag. The EU’s DRC SSR mission is a recent example to this effect (Justaert 2012, 229). In this case, as former colonial powers, Belgium and France who showed strong national interests overrode the common EU interest; whereas France, UK, and the Netherlands, Sweden and Germany had their own national foreign policy-related interests (serious focus on gender) to contribute to the DRC-SSR mission. Portugal was also known to have political interests in the DRC due to its relations with neighbouring Angola (Lurweg 2011, 117). Besides, the DRC mission(s), the EU’s recent intervention in Libya offers another illustrative case where serious vertical incoherencies at the EU are hampering SSR achievements. In this case, Germany breaking ranks with the EU and NATO partners and abstaining from voting for UNSC resolution 1973 was illustrative. Germany’s decision was said to be based on Germany’s own cost and benefit analysis and came as a surprise and a disappointment to other EU member states (Koenig 2011, 22). Germany’s behaviour is pointed out as an extraordinary example as to how its national interest overrode the EU interest and created serious effects in finding a common EU crisis response approach (Koenig 2011, 28). As Koenig writes, ‘while the EU’s response to the Libyan crisis has been multifaceted, nearly every aspect of it was marked by vertical incoherence. The recent institutional reshuffling and the EEAS did not contribute to inter-institutional coherence.'
Although the EU’s crisis response was in line with that of the UN, there was no synergetic co-operation with NATO and the African Union either (2011, 27).

Given this aspect of national interest, researchers claim that the EU’s conflict management policy, hence SSR missions, are dominated by some EU member states (the most telling example is the French domination of any policy on Africa) (Lurweg 2011, 118). Some argue various instances of vertical incoherencies needs to be understood along expectations of European societies of their governments in preventing and managing external crises and fostering domestic values abroad or rather, governments’ attempts to respond to such perceived expectations (Pohl 2013, 320). Regardless of the underlying reasoning’s, what is important to shed light on is the damaging effects that these coherencies have on SSR missions. To this effect, ‘political compromise among the members’ on important matters paint a worrisome picture – as captured in the examples of France and Belgium’s behaviour in DRC and individual Member States interests in taking their own initiatives; therefore, channelling resources through bilateral development co-operation without contributing to joint EU missions, as illustrative of the case of UK in the Congolese police reform (Justaert 2012, 226).

At the extreme end of the spectrum, use of EU missions to pursue individual member states foreign policy interests, is a worst case scenario. In this regard, France and Belgium are often accused of using EU missions to continue their influence in their former colonial territories, The Netherlands and Nordic countries using EU missions to promote their particular brand of foreign policy and development co-operation, and Belgium and Portugal using EU missions to advance general national foreign policy goals, provide stark examples (Ibid 227). At another level, interests of local actors/recipient countries counter run EU’s SSR objectives. Examples to this effect come from Afghanistan, the OPT and from francophone Africa (N'Diaye 2009, 3). Evidences of Congolese elites deliberately working against EU level coherence through welcoming bi-lateral approaches to SSR was found as a way to keep control of the security sector (Justaert 2012, 231).

Since the Treaty of Lisbon and the 2010-14 Stockholm Programme, the EU has been taking steps to address multiple levels of incoherence, especially at horizontal level, by externalising and harmonising EU internal-external security objectives (Monar 2010, 38). However, as some argue, the post-Lisbon institutional structure has done little to compensate for internal divisions and incoherencies within the EU. Further, the EU cannot change the course of national foreign policies. Given these realities, they suggest the EU to demonstrate its ‘leadership for coherence’, Europeanise its crisis response in the medium term and aim at preventing incoherence in the longer term (Koenig 2011, 11).

The EU’s SSR mission in Mali presents a scenario of institutional incoherence. Duplication of efforts, wasting resources, and failure to fulfil critical security functions, are outcomes of it. Lack of institutional coherence and coordination between the EU and NATO missions in Afghanistan rendered peacebuilding efforts and SSR missions weak and unsustainable (Larive op cit.,in Dursun-Ozkanca & Vandemoortele 2012, 148). Experiences form Congolese police reform (Justaert 2012) also exposed incoherence between various public-private actors, even them leading to a competition and a deadlock in implementation of the proposed reforms (Sedra 2010, 19).

Incoherencies between the EU and the US is noteworthy. It is often the case that the United States has its own interests, approach and assumptions towards SSR thinking and
operations. These contradict with the EU’s SSR objectives, sometimes even causing a real dilemma for EU field missions in achieving institutional coherence (ibid) and SSR goals. The SSR missions in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) provide an illustrative case of this. In this case, upon the EU realising the gaps in its original mandate to provide technical assistance to Afghan security forces, the EU immediately shifted its SSR activities from a train and equip model to promoting rule of law and security governance, and oversight institutions. Yet, the US continued its original mission of providing technical assistance with a focus on developing the security capabilities of the Afghan forces. This incident unveils how different EU and US approaches are to the same problem. In Afghanistan, the EU and NATO also demonstrated similar situations. In the Libya case, contrary to the EU’s approach of a military campaign, the AU favoured a political mediation and opposed a no-fly zone proposed by the EU as well as rejected accepting the ICC arrest warrant on Qaddafi. AU’s demonstrated lack of co-operation with the EU and other international security actors alluded to the past friendly ties of the AU with the Qaddafi regime and its generous financial and political support extended to the region (Koenig 2011, 22).

The SSR mission in Somalia provides important insights as to why and how the EU cannot address institutional incoherencies in their field missions due to divergent of interests of actors (political, economic, and cultural) which the EU has no influence over. The counter-terrorism agenda prompted the USA to provide support for the PIS, Kenya’s desire to make Jubaland a buffer zone motivated it to establish the AMISOM operations. In the same vein, the priority assigned to piracy prompted Denmark to establish coastal police posts, whereas Turkey’s foreign policy interests got it involved in social issues, and Chinese resource-related interests prompted it to engage in talks about electricity production. Meanwhile, Ethiopia and Uganda provided basic police training for the SPF as part of their contribution to AMISOM, which fits with their wider engagement in regional and/or African Union activities (Hills 2014, 170). Ironically, sometimes these institutional incoherencies have no impact at operational level for the host nations (i.e. in the Palestinian case), as they pursue things the way they wanted anyway and selectively adopting components of external SSR missions as it fits their interests (Schroeder et al 2014, 216).

Among positive examples of improved coherence, the EU’s increased co-operation with the United Nations, is illustrative. Co-operation between the EU and the UN is guided by four different concepts that touch on both strategic and operational levels. The EU’s ‘modular’ approach that allows extending support to a particular component of UN operations (EU Assistance Mission to AMIS in Darfur is a partial representation of this approach) is one element of it. Also through the use of the ‘bridging model’ (e.g. Operation Artemis, EUFOR Chad/CAR), the EU also rapidly intervenes in situations referred by the UN for a short period and with a clearly defined endpoint. Next, the EU’s standby approach undertakes temporary measures to reinforce an existing UN operation (e.g. EUFOR DRC from 2006). Finally, by using a ‘joint hybrid operation’ model, the UN and EU co-run missions. However, as Tardy argues, contrary to what is written and agreed on paper, in each of these four domains, there are few examples of actual practice. Although there are various approaches defined for achieving multi-stakeholder coherence and institutional coherence between the EU and the UN, the EU’s usual preference is to contribute to UN-mandated operations, meaning that it is more reserved about directly participating in UN-led operations (Tardy op cit., Hynekab 2011, 88).
Similarly since 2001, to maximise the co-operation between the EU and NATO, an institutionalised partnership was launched. The impetus for this renewed partnership was found in earlier commitments to promote greater European responsibility in defence matters (NATO-Western European Union co-operation). The political principles underlying the relationship were set out in the December 2002 NATO-EU Declaration on a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). This partnership assures the EU to access NATO’s planning capabilities for the purpose of its own military operations. The subsequent “Berlin Plus” arrangement also set the basis for establishing a strategic partnership and for the Alliance to support EU-led operations in which NATO as a whole is not engaged (NATO 2015). Under this framework agreement, so far, the EU and NATO have co-operated in several missions, beginning with Macedonia, as well as Bosnia Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and the African Union Darfur mission in Sudan. Similar to the EU-UN co-operation, EU-NATO partnership is being criticised as co-operation "on paper" (Kamp 2013).
6. Concluding Remarks and Avenues for Future Research

Undoubtedly, SSR is one of the key instruments of the EU’s conflict prevention and peacebuilding toolkit. Given the assigned importance to it, SSR receives a great deal of scrutiny from scholars, practitioners and from the policymakers. Some refers to SSR as the “linchpin” of the liberal state building project (Sedra 2013, 271). More critical scholars sees SSR as a vehicle for moving a state’s armed forces – its practices, doctrines and management structures – towards Western norms of behaviour (Bellamy 2003, 106).

Overall, EU’s SSR endeavours suggest ‘two steps forward and one step backward’ and in particularly, SSR operationalization in field missions undertaken so far is far is far from ideal. Given its normative overtone, the EU SSR agenda seems too ambitious and far from the realities in their operational contexts. This is especially the case with regard to SSR interventions in ongoing conflict situations and fragile political environments. Amongst many challenges, lack of legitimacy for EU-SSR interventions and difficulty of building of such where SSR missions are undertaken, is outstanding. Partly, this situation has arisen as a result of continued contestation and resistance between local and international norms. Therefore, taking meaningful and inclusive measures to negotiate these contested norms with local security counterparts is crucial. Given these continued tensions on the normative front, probing further as to how the EU can negotiate the processes of norm transfer, creation and adjustment with key security partners at national, regional and local-micro levels, is deemed important. Building local ownership and operationalising EU’s commitment to principle of gender equality, are two other outcomes related to this. Related to the aspect of gender, currently, in SSR interventions, the EU is accused of not being a role model of gender equality. Therefore, how the EU’s principled commitment to gender is translated in its actual practices in SSR missions, would be an interesting question to probe further. Is the EU conducting GSSR? What utility do the EU and its local security counterparts see in including gender for the success of EU-SSR missions? These are other sub-questions worth the attention.

EU-SSR policy is informed by two approaches; the governance-development and traditional ‘train and equip’. Given the contrasting nature and the outcomes that these two approaches generate, in future research, investigating how, when and where the opportunities and challenges are present, striking a balance between these two approaches within the EU and in SSR operational contexts, is worthwhile.

By emphasizing the technical character of SSR interventions, the EU prefers not to engage with political questions related to SSR. However, the evidences from the operational missions point to the importance and the necessity of engaging with political questions. Therefore, in future research, investigating how EU-SSR interventions manoeuvre political questions seems important. To this effect, applying a nuanced political analytical approach backed by a strong political theory of change appears crucial. The literature survey and the methodological mapping undertaken for this study attest, the majority of EU-SSR studies have applied case study methodology. Although a case study approach allowed the generation of thick descriptions of individual SSR cases, absence of undertaking systematic comparisons between these cases has left theory development on SSR, a daunting task. Along the same
lines, developing theoretical explanations as to why and how different EU-SSR missions have resulted in different outcomes, seems an important line of inquiry for future research. Devising and employing an explicit agency-centric approach privileging an agency-centric political analysis, could help generate analytically rigorous explanations on, how different and specific political-social-economic-cultural constellations in SSR operational contexts influence various SSR outcomes and various degrees of success and failures.

Last, and not least, coherence issues identified at multiple levels of SSR interventions undermine the EU's credibility as a serious security actor. Besides, the EU has limited or sometimes no control over policies and behaviours of a range of security actors who are simultaneously present in SSR operational contexts. Therefore it is very likely that the actions of other security actors have a direct effect on determining outcomes of EU's SSR interventions. Therefore, a critical understanding of the strategies, instruments, resources (tangible and intangible) and leverage available for the EU to address coherence related challenges is worth future scholarly attention.
References


